Exploring Integrity of AEADs with Faults: Definitions and Constructions

Implementation-based attacks are major concerns for modern cryptography. For symmetric-key cryptography, a significant amount of exploration has taken place in this regard for primitives such as block ciphers. Concerning symmetric-key operating modes, such as Authenticated Encryption with Associate...

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Main Authors: Sayandeep Saha, Mustafa Khairallah, Thomas Peyrin
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Ruhr-Universität Bochum 2022-12-01
Series:IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
Subjects:
Online Access:https://tosc.iacr.org/index.php/ToSC/article/view/9980
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author Sayandeep Saha
Mustafa Khairallah
Thomas Peyrin
author_facet Sayandeep Saha
Mustafa Khairallah
Thomas Peyrin
author_sort Sayandeep Saha
collection DOAJ
description Implementation-based attacks are major concerns for modern cryptography. For symmetric-key cryptography, a significant amount of exploration has taken place in this regard for primitives such as block ciphers. Concerning symmetric-key operating modes, such as Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD), the stateof-the-art mainly addresses the passive Side-Channel Attacks (SCA) in the form of leakage resilient cryptography. So far, only a handful of work address Fault Attacks (FA) in the context of AEADs concerning the fundamental properties – integrity and confidentiality. In this paper, we address this gap by exploring mode-level issues arising due to FAs. We emphasize that FAs can be fatal even in cases where the adversary does not aim to extract the long-term secret, but rather tries to violate the basic security requirements (integrity and confidentiality). Notably, we show novel integrity attack examples on state-of-the-art AEAD constructions and even on a prior fault-resilient AEAD construction called SIV$. On the constructive side, we first present new security notions of fault-resilience, for PRF (frPRF), MAC (frMAC) and AEAD (frAE), the latter can be seen as an improved version of the notion introduced by Fischlin and Gunther at CT-RSA’20. Then, we propose new constructions to turn a frPRF into a fault-resilient MAC frMAC (hash-then-frPRF) and into a fault-resilient AEAD frAE (MAC-then-Encrypt-then-MAC or MEM).
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spelling doaj.art-8b95226507fe4eb98f3fdfb8437758d72022-12-22T04:40:58ZengRuhr-Universität BochumIACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology2519-173X2022-12-012022410.46586/tosc.v2022.i4.291-324Exploring Integrity of AEADs with Faults: Definitions and ConstructionsSayandeep Saha0Mustafa Khairallah1Thomas Peyrin2School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore, SingaporeSchool of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore, Singapore; Seagate Research, Singapore, SingaporeSchool of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore, Singapore Implementation-based attacks are major concerns for modern cryptography. For symmetric-key cryptography, a significant amount of exploration has taken place in this regard for primitives such as block ciphers. Concerning symmetric-key operating modes, such as Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD), the stateof-the-art mainly addresses the passive Side-Channel Attacks (SCA) in the form of leakage resilient cryptography. So far, only a handful of work address Fault Attacks (FA) in the context of AEADs concerning the fundamental properties – integrity and confidentiality. In this paper, we address this gap by exploring mode-level issues arising due to FAs. We emphasize that FAs can be fatal even in cases where the adversary does not aim to extract the long-term secret, but rather tries to violate the basic security requirements (integrity and confidentiality). Notably, we show novel integrity attack examples on state-of-the-art AEAD constructions and even on a prior fault-resilient AEAD construction called SIV$. On the constructive side, we first present new security notions of fault-resilience, for PRF (frPRF), MAC (frMAC) and AEAD (frAE), the latter can be seen as an improved version of the notion introduced by Fischlin and Gunther at CT-RSA’20. Then, we propose new constructions to turn a frPRF into a fault-resilient MAC frMAC (hash-then-frPRF) and into a fault-resilient AEAD frAE (MAC-then-Encrypt-then-MAC or MEM). https://tosc.iacr.org/index.php/ToSC/article/view/9980Fault AttackSide-Channel AttackAuthenticated Encryption with Associated Data
spellingShingle Sayandeep Saha
Mustafa Khairallah
Thomas Peyrin
Exploring Integrity of AEADs with Faults: Definitions and Constructions
IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
Fault Attack
Side-Channel Attack
Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
title Exploring Integrity of AEADs with Faults: Definitions and Constructions
title_full Exploring Integrity of AEADs with Faults: Definitions and Constructions
title_fullStr Exploring Integrity of AEADs with Faults: Definitions and Constructions
title_full_unstemmed Exploring Integrity of AEADs with Faults: Definitions and Constructions
title_short Exploring Integrity of AEADs with Faults: Definitions and Constructions
title_sort exploring integrity of aeads with faults definitions and constructions
topic Fault Attack
Side-Channel Attack
Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
url https://tosc.iacr.org/index.php/ToSC/article/view/9980
work_keys_str_mv AT sayandeepsaha exploringintegrityofaeadswithfaultsdefinitionsandconstructions
AT mustafakhairallah exploringintegrityofaeadswithfaultsdefinitionsandconstructions
AT thomaspeyrin exploringintegrityofaeadswithfaultsdefinitionsandconstructions