Joint Detection and State Estimate with GSAs in PMU-Based Smart Grids
The Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) with a GPS signal receiver is a synchronized sensor widely used for power system state estimation. While the GPS receiver ensures time accuracy, it is vulnerable to network attacks. GPS spoofing attacks can alter the phase angle of PMU measurement signals and manipu...
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MDPI AG
2023-07-01
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Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/16/15/5731 |
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author | Feng Hua Wengen Gao Yunfei Li Pengfei Hu Lina Qiao |
author_facet | Feng Hua Wengen Gao Yunfei Li Pengfei Hu Lina Qiao |
author_sort | Feng Hua |
collection | DOAJ |
description | The Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) with a GPS signal receiver is a synchronized sensor widely used for power system state estimation. While the GPS receiver ensures time accuracy, it is vulnerable to network attacks. GPS spoofing attacks can alter the phase angle of PMU measurement signals and manipulate system states. This paper derives a power system state model based on PMUs under GPS spoofing attacks, according to the characteristics of changes in bus voltages and branch currents after GSA. Based on the characteristics of this model, a detection and correction algorithm for attacked data is proposed to detect GSA and correct attacked measurements. The corrected measurements can be used for power system state estimation. Simulation results on the IEEE 14-bus system show that the proposed algorithm improves the accuracy of state estimation under one or multiple GSAs, especially when multiple GSAs are present, compared to classical Weighted Least Squares Estimation (WLSE) and Alternating Minimization (AM) algorithms. Further research indicates that this algorithm is also applicable to large-scale networks. |
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id | doaj.art-8bbc24a0a5c04cffb081e53684ac4605 |
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issn | 1996-1073 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-03-11T00:28:32Z |
publishDate | 2023-07-01 |
publisher | MDPI AG |
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series | Energies |
spelling | doaj.art-8bbc24a0a5c04cffb081e53684ac46052023-11-18T22:52:05ZengMDPI AGEnergies1996-10732023-07-011615573110.3390/en16155731Joint Detection and State Estimate with GSAs in PMU-Based Smart GridsFeng Hua0Wengen Gao1Yunfei Li2Pengfei Hu3Lina Qiao4School of Electrical Engineering, Anhui Polytechnic University, Wuhu 241000, ChinaSchool of Electrical Engineering, Anhui Polytechnic University, Wuhu 241000, ChinaSchool of Electrical Engineering, Anhui Polytechnic University, Wuhu 241000, ChinaSchool of Electrical Engineering, Anhui Polytechnic University, Wuhu 241000, ChinaSchool of Electrical Engineering, Anhui Polytechnic University, Wuhu 241000, ChinaThe Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) with a GPS signal receiver is a synchronized sensor widely used for power system state estimation. While the GPS receiver ensures time accuracy, it is vulnerable to network attacks. GPS spoofing attacks can alter the phase angle of PMU measurement signals and manipulate system states. This paper derives a power system state model based on PMUs under GPS spoofing attacks, according to the characteristics of changes in bus voltages and branch currents after GSA. Based on the characteristics of this model, a detection and correction algorithm for attacked data is proposed to detect GSA and correct attacked measurements. The corrected measurements can be used for power system state estimation. Simulation results on the IEEE 14-bus system show that the proposed algorithm improves the accuracy of state estimation under one or multiple GSAs, especially when multiple GSAs are present, compared to classical Weighted Least Squares Estimation (WLSE) and Alternating Minimization (AM) algorithms. Further research indicates that this algorithm is also applicable to large-scale networks.https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/16/15/5731phasor measurements unit (PMU)GPS spoofing attacks (GSAs)detectioncorrectionstate estimate |
spellingShingle | Feng Hua Wengen Gao Yunfei Li Pengfei Hu Lina Qiao Joint Detection and State Estimate with GSAs in PMU-Based Smart Grids Energies phasor measurements unit (PMU) GPS spoofing attacks (GSAs) detection correction state estimate |
title | Joint Detection and State Estimate with GSAs in PMU-Based Smart Grids |
title_full | Joint Detection and State Estimate with GSAs in PMU-Based Smart Grids |
title_fullStr | Joint Detection and State Estimate with GSAs in PMU-Based Smart Grids |
title_full_unstemmed | Joint Detection and State Estimate with GSAs in PMU-Based Smart Grids |
title_short | Joint Detection and State Estimate with GSAs in PMU-Based Smart Grids |
title_sort | joint detection and state estimate with gsas in pmu based smart grids |
topic | phasor measurements unit (PMU) GPS spoofing attacks (GSAs) detection correction state estimate |
url | https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/16/15/5731 |
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