A Causal-Mentalist View of Propositions
In order to fulfil their essential roles as the bearers of truth and the relata of logical relations, propositions must be public and shareable. That requirement has favoured Platonist and other non-mental views of them, despite the well-known problems of Platonism in general. Views that proposition...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | ces |
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Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
2022-02-01
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| Series: | Organon F |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/03282041orgf.2022.29103.pdf |
| _version_ | 1828335007444238336 |
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| author | Jeremiah Joven B. Joaquin James Franklin |
| author_facet | Jeremiah Joven B. Joaquin James Franklin |
| author_sort | Jeremiah Joven B. Joaquin |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In order to fulfil their essential roles as the bearers of truth and the relata of logical relations, propositions must be public and shareable. That requirement has favoured Platonist and other non-mental views of them, despite the well-known problems of Platonism in general. Views that propositions are mental entities have correspondingly fallen out of favour, as they have difficulty in explaining how propositions could have shareable, objective properties. We revive a mentalist view of propositions, inspired by Artificial Intelligence work on perceptual algorithms, which shows how perception causes persistent mental entities with shareable properties that allow them to fulfil the traditional roles of (one core kind of) propositions. The clustering algorithms implemented in perception produce outputs which are (implicit) atomic propositions in different minds. Coordination of them across minds proceeds by game-theoretic processes of communication. The account does not rely on any unexplained notions such as mental content, representation, or correspondence (although those notions are applicable in philosophical analysis of the result). |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-13T21:40:52Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-8ef97ffa3fab4a14830b2079e3228929 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1335-0668 2585-7150 |
| language | ces |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-13T21:40:52Z |
| publishDate | 2022-02-01 |
| publisher | Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Organon F |
| spelling | doaj.art-8ef97ffa3fab4a14830b2079e32289292022-12-22T02:28:47ZcesInstitute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of SciencesOrganon F1335-06682585-71502022-02-012914777https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29103A Causal-Mentalist View of PropositionsJeremiah Joven B. Joaquin0James Franklin1De La Salle UniversityUniversity of New South WalesIn order to fulfil their essential roles as the bearers of truth and the relata of logical relations, propositions must be public and shareable. That requirement has favoured Platonist and other non-mental views of them, despite the well-known problems of Platonism in general. Views that propositions are mental entities have correspondingly fallen out of favour, as they have difficulty in explaining how propositions could have shareable, objective properties. We revive a mentalist view of propositions, inspired by Artificial Intelligence work on perceptual algorithms, which shows how perception causes persistent mental entities with shareable properties that allow them to fulfil the traditional roles of (one core kind of) propositions. The clustering algorithms implemented in perception produce outputs which are (implicit) atomic propositions in different minds. Coordination of them across minds proceeds by game-theoretic processes of communication. The account does not rely on any unexplained notions such as mental content, representation, or correspondence (although those notions are applicable in philosophical analysis of the result).https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/03282041orgf.2022.29103.pdfpropositionscausal-mentalist viewcluster analysisgame theoryperception algorithmsplatonismsymbol grounding |
| spellingShingle | Jeremiah Joven B. Joaquin James Franklin A Causal-Mentalist View of Propositions Organon F propositions causal-mentalist view cluster analysis game theory perception algorithms platonism symbol grounding |
| title | A Causal-Mentalist View of Propositions |
| title_full | A Causal-Mentalist View of Propositions |
| title_fullStr | A Causal-Mentalist View of Propositions |
| title_full_unstemmed | A Causal-Mentalist View of Propositions |
| title_short | A Causal-Mentalist View of Propositions |
| title_sort | causal mentalist view of propositions |
| topic | propositions causal-mentalist view cluster analysis game theory perception algorithms platonism symbol grounding |
| url | https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/03282041orgf.2022.29103.pdf |
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