| Summary: | Sartre’s account on imagination occurs within the framework of a radicalization of Husserlian intentionality. Whereas Husserl’s concept of constitution was dealing with transcendence as related to the sphere of immanency, Sartre’s phenomenology can’t assume such a reference. But the story is trickier that it seems at first sight. Throughout his enquiry Sartre comes across several kinds of embarrassing transcendences: transcendence of the ego (1936), of some kinds of images (1940), of the self (1943). The aim of this paper is to show how these transcendences point out an implicit renewal: we would find at work in Sartre an operative concept of constitution which does not refer to immanency anymore. We will use imagination as a guiding thread to clarify some of the core elements which are at stake in his theory of constitution: unity, identity and individuality. “Sartre’s concept of constitution” points out a transcendental dimension of his phenomenology which allows reconsidering Sartre’s claim for ontology.
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