Sense of agency in joint action: a critical review of we-agency
The sense of agency refers to the experience of control over voluntary actions and their effects. There is growing interest in the notion of we-agency, whereby individual sense of agency is supplanted by a collective agentic experience. The existence of this unique agentic state would have profound...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Frontiers Media S.A.
2024-01-01
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| Series: | Frontiers in Psychology |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1331084/full |
| _version_ | 1797338432025919488 |
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| author | Alexis Le Besnerais Alexis Le Besnerais James W. Moore Bruno Berberian Ouriel Grynszpan |
| author_facet | Alexis Le Besnerais Alexis Le Besnerais James W. Moore Bruno Berberian Ouriel Grynszpan |
| author_sort | Alexis Le Besnerais |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The sense of agency refers to the experience of control over voluntary actions and their effects. There is growing interest in the notion of we-agency, whereby individual sense of agency is supplanted by a collective agentic experience. The existence of this unique agentic state would have profound implications for human responsibility, and, as such, warrants further scrutiny. In this paper, we review the concept of we-agency and examine whether evidence supports it. We argue that this concept entails multiplying hypothetical agentic states associated with joint action, thus ending up with an entangled phenomenology that appears somewhat speculative when weighted against the available evidence. In light of this, we suggest that the concept of we-agency should be abandoned in favor of a more parsimonious framework for the sense of agency in joint action. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-08T09:31:06Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-8fb434103e57455584809ecda15a35c9 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1664-1078 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-08T09:31:06Z |
| publishDate | 2024-01-01 |
| publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Frontiers in Psychology |
| spelling | doaj.art-8fb434103e57455584809ecda15a35c92024-01-31T04:23:16ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Psychology1664-10782024-01-011510.3389/fpsyg.2024.13310841331084Sense of agency in joint action: a critical review of we-agencyAlexis Le Besnerais0Alexis Le Besnerais1James W. Moore2Bruno Berberian3Ouriel Grynszpan4Information Processing and Systems, Office National d’Etudes et Recherches Aérospatiales, Salon de Provence, FranceLaboratoire Interdisciplinaire des Sciences du Numérique, CNRS, Université Paris-Saclay, Orsay, FrancePsychology Department, Goldsmiths University of London, London, United KingdomInformation Processing and Systems, Office National d’Etudes et Recherches Aérospatiales, Salon de Provence, FranceLaboratoire Interdisciplinaire des Sciences du Numérique, CNRS, Université Paris-Saclay, Orsay, FranceThe sense of agency refers to the experience of control over voluntary actions and their effects. There is growing interest in the notion of we-agency, whereby individual sense of agency is supplanted by a collective agentic experience. The existence of this unique agentic state would have profound implications for human responsibility, and, as such, warrants further scrutiny. In this paper, we review the concept of we-agency and examine whether evidence supports it. We argue that this concept entails multiplying hypothetical agentic states associated with joint action, thus ending up with an entangled phenomenology that appears somewhat speculative when weighted against the available evidence. In light of this, we suggest that the concept of we-agency should be abandoned in favor of a more parsimonious framework for the sense of agency in joint action.https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1331084/fullsense of agencycollective identityjoint actionintentional bindingresponsibilityhuman-machine interaction |
| spellingShingle | Alexis Le Besnerais Alexis Le Besnerais James W. Moore Bruno Berberian Ouriel Grynszpan Sense of agency in joint action: a critical review of we-agency Frontiers in Psychology sense of agency collective identity joint action intentional binding responsibility human-machine interaction |
| title | Sense of agency in joint action: a critical review of we-agency |
| title_full | Sense of agency in joint action: a critical review of we-agency |
| title_fullStr | Sense of agency in joint action: a critical review of we-agency |
| title_full_unstemmed | Sense of agency in joint action: a critical review of we-agency |
| title_short | Sense of agency in joint action: a critical review of we-agency |
| title_sort | sense of agency in joint action a critical review of we agency |
| topic | sense of agency collective identity joint action intentional binding responsibility human-machine interaction |
| url | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1331084/full |
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