| Summary: | Scott, Inbar and Rozin
(2016) presented evidence that trait disgust predicts opposition to genetically
modified food (GMF). Royzman, Cusimano, and Leeman (2017) argued that these
authors did not appropriately measure trait disgust (disgust qua oral
inhibition or OI) and that, once appropriately measured, the hypothesized
association between disgust and GMF attitudes was not present. In their
commentary, Inbar and Scott (2018) challenge our conclusions in several ways.
In this response, we defend our conclusions by showing (a) that OI is
psychometrically distinct from other affective categories, (b) that OI is
widely held to be the criterial feature of disgust and (c) that we were
well-justified to pair OI with the pathogen-linked vignettes that we used.
Furthermore, we extend our critique to the new findings presented by Inbar and
Scott (2018); we show that worry and suspicion (not disgust) are the dominant
affective states one is likely to experience while thinking about GMF and that
the true prevalence of disgust is about zero. We conclude by underscoring that
the present argument and findings are a part of a larger body of evidence
challenging any causal effect of disgust on morality.
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