It’s not right but it’s permitted: Wording effects in moral judgement
This study aims to provide evidence about two widely held assumptions in the experimental study of moral judgment. First, that different terms used to ask for moral judgment (e.g., blame, wrongness, permissibility…) can be treated as synonyms and hence used interchangeably. Second, that the moral an...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Cambridge University Press
2017-05-01
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| Series: | Judgment and Decision Making |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500005908/type/journal_article |
| _version_ | 1797697907226312704 |
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| author | Sergio Barbosa William Jiménez-Leal |
| author_facet | Sergio Barbosa William Jiménez-Leal |
| author_sort | Sergio Barbosa |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This study aims to provide evidence about two widely held assumptions in the experimental study of moral judgment. First, that different terms used to ask for moral judgment (e.g., blame, wrongness, permissibility…) can be treated as synonyms and hence used interchangeably. Second, that the moral and legal status of the judged action are independent of one another and thus moral judgment have no influence of legal or other conventional considerations. Previous research shows mixed results on these claims. We recruited 660 participants who provided moral judgment to three identical sacrificial dilemmas using seven different terms. We experimentally manipulated the explicit legal status of the judged action. Results suggest that terms that highlight the utilitarian nature of the judged action cause harsher moral judgments as a mechanism of reputation preservation. Also, the manipulation of the legal status of the judged action holds for all considered terms but is larger for impermissibility judgments. Taken as a whole, our results imply that, although subtle, different terms used to ask for moral judgment have theoretically and methodologically relevant differences which calls for further scrutiny. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T03:46:39Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-90701daf26c9452ab85956f7feabf2ec |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1930-2975 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T03:46:39Z |
| publishDate | 2017-05-01 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Judgment and Decision Making |
| spelling | doaj.art-90701daf26c9452ab85956f7feabf2ec2023-09-03T12:44:16ZengCambridge University PressJudgment and Decision Making1930-29752017-05-011230831310.1017/S1930297500005908It’s not right but it’s permitted: Wording effects in moral judgementSergio Barbosa0William Jiménez-Leal1Departamento de Psicología, Universidad de los Andes, Cra. 1 Nº 18ª–12, Edificio Franco Bogotá, 111711. ColombiaDepartamento de Psicología, Universidad de los AndesThis study aims to provide evidence about two widely held assumptions in the experimental study of moral judgment. First, that different terms used to ask for moral judgment (e.g., blame, wrongness, permissibility…) can be treated as synonyms and hence used interchangeably. Second, that the moral and legal status of the judged action are independent of one another and thus moral judgment have no influence of legal or other conventional considerations. Previous research shows mixed results on these claims. We recruited 660 participants who provided moral judgment to three identical sacrificial dilemmas using seven different terms. We experimentally manipulated the explicit legal status of the judged action. Results suggest that terms that highlight the utilitarian nature of the judged action cause harsher moral judgments as a mechanism of reputation preservation. Also, the manipulation of the legal status of the judged action holds for all considered terms but is larger for impermissibility judgments. Taken as a whole, our results imply that, although subtle, different terms used to ask for moral judgment have theoretically and methodologically relevant differences which calls for further scrutiny.https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500005908/type/journal_articlemoral judgmentwording effectssocial conventionslaw |
| spellingShingle | Sergio Barbosa William Jiménez-Leal It’s not right but it’s permitted: Wording effects in moral judgement Judgment and Decision Making moral judgment wording effects social conventions law |
| title | It’s not right but it’s permitted: Wording effects in moral judgement |
| title_full | It’s not right but it’s permitted: Wording effects in moral judgement |
| title_fullStr | It’s not right but it’s permitted: Wording effects in moral judgement |
| title_full_unstemmed | It’s not right but it’s permitted: Wording effects in moral judgement |
| title_short | It’s not right but it’s permitted: Wording effects in moral judgement |
| title_sort | it s not right but it s permitted wording effects in moral judgement |
| topic | moral judgment wording effects social conventions law |
| url | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500005908/type/journal_article |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT sergiobarbosa itsnotrightbutitspermittedwordingeffectsinmoraljudgement AT williamjimenezleal itsnotrightbutitspermittedwordingeffectsinmoraljudgement |