Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: The Problem of Moral Hazard(Sigorta Piyasalarında Asimetrik Bilgi ve İstenmeyen Tercih: Etik Tehlike Problemi)
The problem of asymmetric information occurs when one party of an economic transaction has insufficient knowledge about the other party to make accurate decisions. The moral hazard, on the other hand, is the risk that one party to a contract can change their behaviour to the detriment of the other p...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
| Published: |
Celal Bayar University
2009-01-01
|
| Series: | Yönetim ve Ekonomi |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www2.bayar.edu.tr/yonetimekonomi/dergi/pdf/C16S12009/107_114.pdf |
| Summary: | The problem of asymmetric information occurs when one party of an economic transaction has insufficient knowledge about the other party to make accurate decisions. The moral hazard, on the other hand, is the risk that one party to a contract can change their behaviour to the detriment of the other party once the contract has been concluded. In insurance market the moral hazard is tendency by which people expend less effort protecting those goods which are insured against theft or damage. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1302-0064 |