Antonio Pérez (1599-1649) on Intentional Identity: A Revisionism of Peter Auriol’s Thought

This article is aimed to study Antonio Perez’s criticism against Peter Auriol’s theory of intentional identity. Pérez’s theory of cognition is clearly in debt with Auriol’s theory of intentionality. The Spanish Jesuit often uses the same linguistic expressions of Auriol (such as apparent being) and...

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Main Author: Gian Pietro Soliani
Format: Article
Language:deu
Published: Universidad de Buenos Aires 2023-05-01
Series:Patristica et Mediaevalia
Subjects:
Online Access:http://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/11971
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author Gian Pietro Soliani
author_facet Gian Pietro Soliani
author_sort Gian Pietro Soliani
collection DOAJ
description This article is aimed to study Antonio Perez’s criticism against Peter Auriol’s theory of intentional identity. Pérez’s theory of cognition is clearly in debt with Auriol’s theory of intentionality. The Spanish Jesuit often uses the same linguistic expressions of Auriol (such as apparent being) and agrees with him about the intentional identity between the cogniser –conciding in act with the act of cognition–, and the cognised object, which is the same thing existing outside the intellect. Both Pérez and Auriol ground their theory of intentional identity on Aristotle’s De anima, but the Spanish Jesuit highlights an inconsistency in Auriol’s doctrine which contradicts what succinctly stated by Aristotle about the identity between the cogniser and the cognised during the act of cognition. By reviewing in-depth Auriol’s theory of intentional identity, conceived as a kind of identity of indistinction, Pérez points out an inconsistency between Auriol’s description of the act of cognition and his conception of the identity of indistinction. Furthermore, Pérez seems to consider insufficient Auriol’s identity of indistinction used to describe the intentional identity characterising the act of cognition. Consequently, he offers a new definition of the identity of indistinction in order to present the apparent being as an undetermined reality which can be determined by any intelligible content. This Perezian review of Auriol’s theory of the apparent being, on the one hand, can be considered as a case of the early modern scholastic revisionism applied to a medieval thinker and, on the other hand, finds a wider application in Pérez’s metaphysics and philosophical anthropology.
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spelling doaj.art-90cebcaeff8b46019d93dc8a671004252023-07-19T09:13:37ZdeuUniversidad de Buenos AiresPatristica et Mediaevalia0325-22802683-96362023-05-0144110.34096/petm.v44.n1.1197111971Antonio Pérez (1599-1649) on Intentional Identity: A Revisionism of Peter Auriol’s ThoughtGian Pietro Soliani0Università Ca' Foscari di VeneziaThis article is aimed to study Antonio Perez’s criticism against Peter Auriol’s theory of intentional identity. Pérez’s theory of cognition is clearly in debt with Auriol’s theory of intentionality. The Spanish Jesuit often uses the same linguistic expressions of Auriol (such as apparent being) and agrees with him about the intentional identity between the cogniser –conciding in act with the act of cognition–, and the cognised object, which is the same thing existing outside the intellect. Both Pérez and Auriol ground their theory of intentional identity on Aristotle’s De anima, but the Spanish Jesuit highlights an inconsistency in Auriol’s doctrine which contradicts what succinctly stated by Aristotle about the identity between the cogniser and the cognised during the act of cognition. By reviewing in-depth Auriol’s theory of intentional identity, conceived as a kind of identity of indistinction, Pérez points out an inconsistency between Auriol’s description of the act of cognition and his conception of the identity of indistinction. Furthermore, Pérez seems to consider insufficient Auriol’s identity of indistinction used to describe the intentional identity characterising the act of cognition. Consequently, he offers a new definition of the identity of indistinction in order to present the apparent being as an undetermined reality which can be determined by any intelligible content. This Perezian review of Auriol’s theory of the apparent being, on the one hand, can be considered as a case of the early modern scholastic revisionism applied to a medieval thinker and, on the other hand, finds a wider application in Pérez’s metaphysics and philosophical anthropology.http://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/11971antonio pérezpeter auriolintentionalitytheory of cognitionapparent being
spellingShingle Gian Pietro Soliani
Antonio Pérez (1599-1649) on Intentional Identity: A Revisionism of Peter Auriol’s Thought
Patristica et Mediaevalia
antonio pérez
peter auriol
intentionality
theory of cognition
apparent being
title Antonio Pérez (1599-1649) on Intentional Identity: A Revisionism of Peter Auriol’s Thought
title_full Antonio Pérez (1599-1649) on Intentional Identity: A Revisionism of Peter Auriol’s Thought
title_fullStr Antonio Pérez (1599-1649) on Intentional Identity: A Revisionism of Peter Auriol’s Thought
title_full_unstemmed Antonio Pérez (1599-1649) on Intentional Identity: A Revisionism of Peter Auriol’s Thought
title_short Antonio Pérez (1599-1649) on Intentional Identity: A Revisionism of Peter Auriol’s Thought
title_sort antonio perez 1599 1649 on intentional identity a revisionism of peter auriol s thought
topic antonio pérez
peter auriol
intentionality
theory of cognition
apparent being
url http://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/11971
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