Thinking as Evidence for the Probability of the Existence of a God: An Argument from Unnaturalness for Necessity
The objective of this article is to show that it is justified to assert that the existence of God is plausible, considering the fact that thinking itself is an immediate outcome (effect) of a thinker (cause). This idea may seem evident, but it is in fact challenged by certain claims of cognitive phi...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of Religions and Denominations Press
2017-12-01
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| Series: | Religious Inquiries |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ri.urd.ac.ir/article_54768_0dfff54d57580753bfa52b2ac3dbb493.pdf |
| _version_ | 1797718900393115648 |
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| author | Javad Taheri |
| author_facet | Javad Taheri |
| author_sort | Javad Taheri |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The objective of this article is to show that it is justified to assert that the existence of God is plausible, considering the fact that thinking itself is an immediate outcome (effect) of a thinker (cause). This idea may seem evident, but it is in fact challenged by certain claims of cognitive philosophers who aver that our knowledge of necessity and causation is, in the final analysis, bounded by our naturalness. That is to say, what we understand of necessity and causation is originally based on root-experiences we have had from the early moments of our birth onward or even before our birth. This article tries to display that giving a model for a kind of necessity which is not essentially built upon the naturalness of human experiences can negate the universality of believing in the naturalness of human understanding. With this, one can prove the probability of the existence of a Necessary Being, whose necessity is different from the so-called embodied necessity. However, the Necessary Being is not equal to all conceptions of God, but it is equal to some of them. The article concludes that the probability of the existence of God (of a particular kind) is an inevitable outcome, even with the presupposition of cognitive philosophers. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T08:57:55Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-911ae5d689fa42e69c8186760af32e33 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2322-4894 2538-6271 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T08:57:55Z |
| publishDate | 2017-12-01 |
| publisher | University of Religions and Denominations Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Religious Inquiries |
| spelling | doaj.art-911ae5d689fa42e69c8186760af32e332023-09-02T15:53:45ZengUniversity of Religions and Denominations PressReligious Inquiries2322-48942538-62712017-12-01612576654768Thinking as Evidence for the Probability of the Existence of a God: An Argument from Unnaturalness for NecessityJavad Taheri0MA Graduate of Philosophy of Religion, Allameh Tabatabaei University, Tehran, IranThe objective of this article is to show that it is justified to assert that the existence of God is plausible, considering the fact that thinking itself is an immediate outcome (effect) of a thinker (cause). This idea may seem evident, but it is in fact challenged by certain claims of cognitive philosophers who aver that our knowledge of necessity and causation is, in the final analysis, bounded by our naturalness. That is to say, what we understand of necessity and causation is originally based on root-experiences we have had from the early moments of our birth onward or even before our birth. This article tries to display that giving a model for a kind of necessity which is not essentially built upon the naturalness of human experiences can negate the universality of believing in the naturalness of human understanding. With this, one can prove the probability of the existence of a Necessary Being, whose necessity is different from the so-called embodied necessity. However, the Necessary Being is not equal to all conceptions of God, but it is equal to some of them. The article concludes that the probability of the existence of God (of a particular kind) is an inevitable outcome, even with the presupposition of cognitive philosophers.https://ri.urd.ac.ir/article_54768_0dfff54d57580753bfa52b2ac3dbb493.pdfcognitive philosophycausationnecessitythinkingnecessary beinggod |
| spellingShingle | Javad Taheri Thinking as Evidence for the Probability of the Existence of a God: An Argument from Unnaturalness for Necessity Religious Inquiries cognitive philosophy causation necessity thinking necessary being god |
| title | Thinking as Evidence for the Probability of the Existence of a God: An Argument from Unnaturalness for Necessity |
| title_full | Thinking as Evidence for the Probability of the Existence of a God: An Argument from Unnaturalness for Necessity |
| title_fullStr | Thinking as Evidence for the Probability of the Existence of a God: An Argument from Unnaturalness for Necessity |
| title_full_unstemmed | Thinking as Evidence for the Probability of the Existence of a God: An Argument from Unnaturalness for Necessity |
| title_short | Thinking as Evidence for the Probability of the Existence of a God: An Argument from Unnaturalness for Necessity |
| title_sort | thinking as evidence for the probability of the existence of a god an argument from unnaturalness for necessity |
| topic | cognitive philosophy causation necessity thinking necessary being god |
| url | https://ri.urd.ac.ir/article_54768_0dfff54d57580753bfa52b2ac3dbb493.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT javadtaheri thinkingasevidencefortheprobabilityoftheexistenceofagodanargumentfromunnaturalnessfornecessity |