Inferences in the First Person
This paper deals with the experiential basis of deductive reasoning. It concentrates on the case of inferential knowledge in the first person. It first describes the specific kind of entitlement involved in such knowledge. A comparison is then made with inferential knowledge involving other indexica...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Rosenberg & Sellier
2017-01-01
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| Series: | Phenomenology and Mind |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7235 |
| _version_ | 1818405994148921344 |
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| author | Gianfranco Soldati |
| author_facet | Gianfranco Soldati |
| author_sort | Gianfranco Soldati |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This paper deals with the experiential basis of deductive reasoning. It concentrates on the case of inferential knowledge in the first person. It first describes the specific kind of entitlement involved in such knowledge. A comparison is then made with inferential knowledge involving other indexical and demonstrative concepts. The entitlement involved in those cases is based on the fact that indexicals such as “here” and “now” are associated with experiential concepts. It is submitted that the concept associated to the expression “I” is an experiential concept application of which presupposes a special sensitivity to the identity of the self through time. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-14T09:04:53Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-91b5b76af938440893d881d80fc74e0e |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2280-7853 2239-4028 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-14T09:04:53Z |
| publishDate | 2017-01-01 |
| publisher | Rosenberg & Sellier |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Phenomenology and Mind |
| spelling | doaj.art-91b5b76af938440893d881d80fc74e0e2022-12-21T23:08:43ZengRosenberg & SellierPhenomenology and Mind2280-78532239-40282017-01-011010.13128/Phe_Mi-2009816858Inferences in the First PersonGianfranco SoldatiThis paper deals with the experiential basis of deductive reasoning. It concentrates on the case of inferential knowledge in the first person. It first describes the specific kind of entitlement involved in such knowledge. A comparison is then made with inferential knowledge involving other indexical and demonstrative concepts. The entitlement involved in those cases is based on the fact that indexicals such as “here” and “now” are associated with experiential concepts. It is submitted that the concept associated to the expression “I” is an experiential concept application of which presupposes a special sensitivity to the identity of the self through time.https://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7235first personphenomenologyexperience |
| spellingShingle | Gianfranco Soldati Inferences in the First Person Phenomenology and Mind first person phenomenology experience |
| title | Inferences in the First Person |
| title_full | Inferences in the First Person |
| title_fullStr | Inferences in the First Person |
| title_full_unstemmed | Inferences in the First Person |
| title_short | Inferences in the First Person |
| title_sort | inferences in the first person |
| topic | first person phenomenology experience |
| url | https://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7235 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT gianfrancosoldati inferencesinthefirstperson |