Game Theoretic Strategies for Supplier Capability Assessment and Manufacturing Order Allocation
An effective method is required to determine the amount and priority for the deployment of suppliers for multiple manufacturing processes, particularly when the available budget for each manufacturing process is limited. In this study, we propose an integrated approach for supplier assessment that c...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Society for Risk Analysis - China
2020-10-01
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| Series: | Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response (JRACR) |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.atlantis-press.com/article/125945412/view |
| _version_ | 1818533782583508992 |
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| author | Cheng-Kuang Wu Yu-Min Chuang |
| author_facet | Cheng-Kuang Wu Yu-Min Chuang |
| author_sort | Cheng-Kuang Wu |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | An effective method is required to determine the amount and priority for the deployment of suppliers for multiple manufacturing processes, particularly when the available budget for each manufacturing process is limited. In this study, we propose an integrated approach for supplier assessment that consists of two game theory models which are designed to recommend manufacturers on how best to choose suppliers given budgetary limitations. In the first model, the interactive behaviors between the key factors representing the manufacturer and the supplier are modeled and analyzed as a two-player and zero-sum game, after which the Supplier Power Value (SPV) is derived from the pure or mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. In the second model, 12 SPVs are used to compute a Shapley value for each supplier, in terms of the thresholds of the majority levels in one manufacturing process. The Shapley values are then applied to create an allocated set of limited manufacturing orders for suppliers. The experimental results present that the manufacturer can use our approach to quantitatively evaluate the suppliers and easily allocate suppliers within one manufacturing process. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-11T18:03:18Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-91e7f2a8d4214243948076b9de7582aa |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2210-8505 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-11T18:03:18Z |
| publishDate | 2020-10-01 |
| publisher | Society for Risk Analysis - China |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response (JRACR) |
| spelling | doaj.art-91e7f2a8d4214243948076b9de7582aa2022-12-22T00:55:49ZengSociety for Risk Analysis - ChinaJournal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response (JRACR)2210-85052020-10-0110410.2991/jracr.k.201014.002Game Theoretic Strategies for Supplier Capability Assessment and Manufacturing Order AllocationCheng-Kuang WuYu-Min ChuangAn effective method is required to determine the amount and priority for the deployment of suppliers for multiple manufacturing processes, particularly when the available budget for each manufacturing process is limited. In this study, we propose an integrated approach for supplier assessment that consists of two game theory models which are designed to recommend manufacturers on how best to choose suppliers given budgetary limitations. In the first model, the interactive behaviors between the key factors representing the manufacturer and the supplier are modeled and analyzed as a two-player and zero-sum game, after which the Supplier Power Value (SPV) is derived from the pure or mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. In the second model, 12 SPVs are used to compute a Shapley value for each supplier, in terms of the thresholds of the majority levels in one manufacturing process. The Shapley values are then applied to create an allocated set of limited manufacturing orders for suppliers. The experimental results present that the manufacturer can use our approach to quantitatively evaluate the suppliers and easily allocate suppliers within one manufacturing process.https://www.atlantis-press.com/article/125945412/viewSupplier power valueNash equilibriumShapley valuesupplier allocation |
| spellingShingle | Cheng-Kuang Wu Yu-Min Chuang Game Theoretic Strategies for Supplier Capability Assessment and Manufacturing Order Allocation Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response (JRACR) Supplier power value Nash equilibrium Shapley value supplier allocation |
| title | Game Theoretic Strategies for Supplier Capability
Assessment and Manufacturing Order Allocation |
| title_full | Game Theoretic Strategies for Supplier Capability
Assessment and Manufacturing Order Allocation |
| title_fullStr | Game Theoretic Strategies for Supplier Capability
Assessment and Manufacturing Order Allocation |
| title_full_unstemmed | Game Theoretic Strategies for Supplier Capability
Assessment and Manufacturing Order Allocation |
| title_short | Game Theoretic Strategies for Supplier Capability
Assessment and Manufacturing Order Allocation |
| title_sort | game theoretic strategies for supplier capability assessment and manufacturing order allocation |
| topic | Supplier power value Nash equilibrium Shapley value supplier allocation |
| url | https://www.atlantis-press.com/article/125945412/view |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT chengkuangwu gametheoreticstrategiesforsuppliercapabilityassessmentandmanufacturingorderallocation AT yuminchuang gametheoreticstrategiesforsuppliercapabilityassessmentandmanufacturingorderallocation |