Non-Representational Mathematical Realism

<p>This paper is an attempt to convince anti-realists that their correct intuitions against the metaphysical inflationism derived from some versions of mathematical realism do not force them to embrace non-standard, epistemic approaches to truth and existence. It is also an attempt to convince...

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Main Author: Maria Jose Frapolli
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of the Basque Country 2015-11-01
Series:Theoria
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/14105
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author Maria Jose Frapolli
author_facet Maria Jose Frapolli
author_sort Maria Jose Frapolli
collection DOAJ
description <p>This paper is an attempt to convince anti-realists that their correct intuitions against the metaphysical inflationism derived from some versions of mathematical realism do not force them to embrace non-standard, epistemic approaches to truth and existence. It is also an attempt to convince mathematical realists that they do not need to implement their perfectly sound and judicious intuitions with the anti-intuitive developments that render full-blown mathematical realism into a view which even Gödel considered objectionable (Gödel 1995, p. 150).</p><p>I will argue for the following two theses: (i) that realism, in its standard characterization, is our default position, a position in agreement with our pre-theoretical intuitions and with the results of our best semantic theories, and (ii) that most of the metaphysical qualms usually related to it depends on a poor understanding of truth and existence as higher-order concepts. </p>
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spelling doaj.art-92504d56064f492c9a12e749c0633f392022-12-22T00:31:13ZengUniversity of the Basque CountryTheoria0495-45482171-679X2015-11-0130333134810.1387/theoria.1410511587Non-Representational Mathematical RealismMaria Jose Frapolli0University of Granada (Spain) University College (UK)<p>This paper is an attempt to convince anti-realists that their correct intuitions against the metaphysical inflationism derived from some versions of mathematical realism do not force them to embrace non-standard, epistemic approaches to truth and existence. It is also an attempt to convince mathematical realists that they do not need to implement their perfectly sound and judicious intuitions with the anti-intuitive developments that render full-blown mathematical realism into a view which even Gödel considered objectionable (Gödel 1995, p. 150).</p><p>I will argue for the following two theses: (i) that realism, in its standard characterization, is our default position, a position in agreement with our pre-theoretical intuitions and with the results of our best semantic theories, and (ii) that most of the metaphysical qualms usually related to it depends on a poor understanding of truth and existence as higher-order concepts. </p>http://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/14105Realism, Representationalism, Existence, Truth
spellingShingle Maria Jose Frapolli
Non-Representational Mathematical Realism
Theoria
Realism, Representationalism, Existence, Truth
title Non-Representational Mathematical Realism
title_full Non-Representational Mathematical Realism
title_fullStr Non-Representational Mathematical Realism
title_full_unstemmed Non-Representational Mathematical Realism
title_short Non-Representational Mathematical Realism
title_sort non representational mathematical realism
topic Realism, Representationalism, Existence, Truth
url http://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/14105
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