Creating a “Market for Inventions”: A Referee Model
This article considers that the flow of new not patented innovations is difficult to occur among firms, especially when some inventions are caused by serendipity. Here I develop a model to analyze the conditions for a “market for inventions” to exist. With the help of game theory in particular, I sh...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Universidad Alberto Hurtado
2008-10-01
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Series: | Journal of Technology Management & Innovation |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.jotmi.org/index.php/GT/article/view/434 |
Summary: | This article considers that the flow of new not patented innovations is difficult to occur among firms, especially when some inventions are caused by serendipity. Here I develop a model to analyze the conditions for a “market for inventions” to exist. With the help of game theory in particular, I show that the creation of such a market is quite unlikely because unfair buyer’s behaviour and the possibility of expropriation of the new innovation renders the seller reluctant to negotiate with a potential buyer. So I argue for a solution that involves a third referenced party into the negotiation so that it can guarantee the flow of ideas among institutions and generate a surplus for the whole society. |
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ISSN: | 0718-2724 |