Creating a “Market for Inventions”: A Referee Model

This article considers that the flow of new not patented innovations is difficult to occur among firms, especially when some inventions are caused by serendipity. Here I develop a model to analyze the conditions for a “market for inventions” to exist. With the help of game theory in particular, I sh...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Gesualdo Grimaldi
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universidad Alberto Hurtado 2008-10-01
Series:Journal of Technology Management & Innovation
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.jotmi.org/index.php/GT/article/view/434
Description
Summary:This article considers that the flow of new not patented innovations is difficult to occur among firms, especially when some inventions are caused by serendipity. Here I develop a model to analyze the conditions for a “market for inventions” to exist. With the help of game theory in particular, I show that the creation of such a market is quite unlikely because unfair buyer’s behaviour and the possibility of expropriation of the new innovation renders the seller reluctant to negotiate with a potential buyer. So I argue for a solution that involves a third referenced party into the negotiation so that it can guarantee the flow of ideas among institutions and generate a surplus for the whole society.
ISSN:0718-2724