Time-Preference Heterogeneity and Multiplicity of Equilibria in Two-Group Bargaining

Time-Preference Heterogeneity and Multiplicity of Equilibria in Two-Group Bargaining

We consider a multilateral bargaining game in which the agents can be classified into two groups according to their instantaneous preferences. In one of these groups there is one agent with a different discount factor. We analyze how this time-preference heterogeneity may generate multiplicity of eq...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Daniel Cardona, Antoni Rubí-Barceló
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2016-05-01
Series:Games
Subjects:
multilateral bargaining
one-dimensional
multiple equilibria
time preference
C78
Online Access:http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/7/2/12

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