Official promotion and extreme environmental regulation: Evidence from prefecture-level cities in China
Under the background of Chinese decentralization, avoiding the shortsightedness of local officials has become the policy focus of the central government's environmental regulation. In recent years, with the achievement of environmental protection gradually becoming a necessity for promotion, lo...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Frontiers Media S.A.
2022-11-01
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| Series: | Frontiers in Public Health |
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| Online Access: | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2022.1029869/full |
| _version_ | 1811304864724025344 |
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| author | Zuhan Meng Anna Shi Anna Shi Sixuan Du |
| author_facet | Zuhan Meng Anna Shi Anna Shi Sixuan Du |
| author_sort | Zuhan Meng |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Under the background of Chinese decentralization, avoiding the shortsightedness of local officials has become the policy focus of the central government's environmental regulation. In recent years, with the achievement of environmental protection gradually becoming a necessity for promotion, local officials increasingly prefer to implement extreme environmental regulation (EER) to quickly control environmental deterioration. Based on this specific fact, this paper constructs a systematic GMM model, trying to study whether the promotion of officials can fully explain the executive logic of EER under the influence of limited tenure and geographical rotation. It is found that EER and limited tenure have a U-shaped relationship, and geographical rotation can inhibit EER during the limited tenure. In addition, China has not formed an “environment-only” promotion tournament. Heterogeneity analysis showed that in areas with high bureaucratic compliance, local officials are late in strengthening EER during their tenure while the inhibition effect of geographical rotation is poor; Compared with older officials, young officials have stronger motivation to implement EER, and the inhibition of geographical rotation is obvious. To sum up, our research shows that the green promotion system only enhances officials' demands for environmental achievements, but it does not restrict officials' short-sighted governance strategies. The central government should start by expanding environmental protection assessment indicators and improving the quality of official rotation to narrow the implementation space of EER, thereby encouraging local governments to promote stable and sound environmental governance in a compliant and long-term manner. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-13T08:14:56Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-94d6174adcb0481d8f1b8c8308126f9b |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2296-2565 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-13T08:14:56Z |
| publishDate | 2022-11-01 |
| publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Frontiers in Public Health |
| spelling | doaj.art-94d6174adcb0481d8f1b8c8308126f9b2022-12-22T02:54:51ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Public Health2296-25652022-11-011010.3389/fpubh.2022.10298691029869Official promotion and extreme environmental regulation: Evidence from prefecture-level cities in ChinaZuhan Meng0Anna Shi1Anna Shi2Sixuan Du3Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing, ChinaBusiness School, Hohai University, Nanjing, ChinaYangtze River Protection and Green Development Research Institute, Hohai University, Nanjing, ChinaBusiness School, Hohai University, Nanjing, ChinaUnder the background of Chinese decentralization, avoiding the shortsightedness of local officials has become the policy focus of the central government's environmental regulation. In recent years, with the achievement of environmental protection gradually becoming a necessity for promotion, local officials increasingly prefer to implement extreme environmental regulation (EER) to quickly control environmental deterioration. Based on this specific fact, this paper constructs a systematic GMM model, trying to study whether the promotion of officials can fully explain the executive logic of EER under the influence of limited tenure and geographical rotation. It is found that EER and limited tenure have a U-shaped relationship, and geographical rotation can inhibit EER during the limited tenure. In addition, China has not formed an “environment-only” promotion tournament. Heterogeneity analysis showed that in areas with high bureaucratic compliance, local officials are late in strengthening EER during their tenure while the inhibition effect of geographical rotation is poor; Compared with older officials, young officials have stronger motivation to implement EER, and the inhibition of geographical rotation is obvious. To sum up, our research shows that the green promotion system only enhances officials' demands for environmental achievements, but it does not restrict officials' short-sighted governance strategies. The central government should start by expanding environmental protection assessment indicators and improving the quality of official rotation to narrow the implementation space of EER, thereby encouraging local governments to promote stable and sound environmental governance in a compliant and long-term manner.https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2022.1029869/fullofficial promotionextreme environmental regulationlimited tenuregeographical rotationsystematic GMM model |
| spellingShingle | Zuhan Meng Anna Shi Anna Shi Sixuan Du Official promotion and extreme environmental regulation: Evidence from prefecture-level cities in China Frontiers in Public Health official promotion extreme environmental regulation limited tenure geographical rotation systematic GMM model |
| title | Official promotion and extreme environmental regulation: Evidence from prefecture-level cities in China |
| title_full | Official promotion and extreme environmental regulation: Evidence from prefecture-level cities in China |
| title_fullStr | Official promotion and extreme environmental regulation: Evidence from prefecture-level cities in China |
| title_full_unstemmed | Official promotion and extreme environmental regulation: Evidence from prefecture-level cities in China |
| title_short | Official promotion and extreme environmental regulation: Evidence from prefecture-level cities in China |
| title_sort | official promotion and extreme environmental regulation evidence from prefecture level cities in china |
| topic | official promotion extreme environmental regulation limited tenure geographical rotation systematic GMM model |
| url | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2022.1029869/full |
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