Self-induced class stratification in competitive societies of agents: Nash stability in the presence of envy
Envy, the inclination to compare rewards, can be expected to unfold when inequalities in terms of pay-off differences are generated in competitive societies. It is shown that increasing levels of envy lead inevitably to a self-induced separation into a lower and an upper class. Class stratification...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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The Royal Society
2020-06-01
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| Series: | Royal Society Open Science |
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| Online Access: | https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rsos.200411 |
| _version_ | 1819004964187406336 |
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| author | Claudius Gros |
| author_facet | Claudius Gros |
| author_sort | Claudius Gros |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Envy, the inclination to compare rewards, can be expected to unfold when inequalities in terms of pay-off differences are generated in competitive societies. It is shown that increasing levels of envy lead inevitably to a self-induced separation into a lower and an upper class. Class stratification is Nash stable and strict, with members of the same class receiving identical rewards. Upper-class agents play exclusively pure strategies, all lower-class agents the same mixed strategy. The fraction of upper-class agents decreases progressively with larger levels of envy, until a single upper-class agent is left. Numerical simulations and a complete analytic treatment of a basic reference model, the shopping trouble model, are presented. The properties of the class-stratified society are universal and only indirectly controllable through the underlying utility function, which implies that class-stratified societies are intrinsically resistant to political control. Implications for human societies are discussed. It is pointed out that the repercussions of envy are amplified when societies become increasingly competitive. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-20T23:45:15Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-950aa136421b486ab91c1b34487279fc |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2054-5703 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-20T23:45:15Z |
| publishDate | 2020-06-01 |
| publisher | The Royal Society |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Royal Society Open Science |
| spelling | doaj.art-950aa136421b486ab91c1b34487279fc2022-12-21T19:22:57ZengThe Royal SocietyRoyal Society Open Science2054-57032020-06-017610.1098/rsos.200411200411Self-induced class stratification in competitive societies of agents: Nash stability in the presence of envyClaudius GrosEnvy, the inclination to compare rewards, can be expected to unfold when inequalities in terms of pay-off differences are generated in competitive societies. It is shown that increasing levels of envy lead inevitably to a self-induced separation into a lower and an upper class. Class stratification is Nash stable and strict, with members of the same class receiving identical rewards. Upper-class agents play exclusively pure strategies, all lower-class agents the same mixed strategy. The fraction of upper-class agents decreases progressively with larger levels of envy, until a single upper-class agent is left. Numerical simulations and a complete analytic treatment of a basic reference model, the shopping trouble model, are presented. The properties of the class-stratified society are universal and only indirectly controllable through the underlying utility function, which implies that class-stratified societies are intrinsically resistant to political control. Implications for human societies are discussed. It is pointed out that the repercussions of envy are amplified when societies become increasingly competitive.https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rsos.200411game theorysocial modellingclass separationsocial stratification |
| spellingShingle | Claudius Gros Self-induced class stratification in competitive societies of agents: Nash stability in the presence of envy Royal Society Open Science game theory social modelling class separation social stratification |
| title | Self-induced class stratification in competitive societies of agents: Nash stability in the presence of envy |
| title_full | Self-induced class stratification in competitive societies of agents: Nash stability in the presence of envy |
| title_fullStr | Self-induced class stratification in competitive societies of agents: Nash stability in the presence of envy |
| title_full_unstemmed | Self-induced class stratification in competitive societies of agents: Nash stability in the presence of envy |
| title_short | Self-induced class stratification in competitive societies of agents: Nash stability in the presence of envy |
| title_sort | self induced class stratification in competitive societies of agents nash stability in the presence of envy |
| topic | game theory social modelling class separation social stratification |
| url | https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rsos.200411 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT claudiusgros selfinducedclassstratificationincompetitivesocietiesofagentsnashstabilityinthepresenceofenvy |