Decentralization is Vulnerable Under the Gap Game
The blockchain is the core mechanism of Bitcoin, which is mainly enabled by a distributed consensus mechanism. Essentially, in Proof-of-Work-based consensus protocol, the miners generate a series of blocks to realize decentralization practical. Miners receive two types of revenue: block rewards and...
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
IEEE
2019-01-01
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| Series: | IEEE Access |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8756129/ |
| _version_ | 1818855727705358336 |
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| author | Yiran Liu Junming Ke Qiuliang Xu Han Jiang Hao Wang |
| author_facet | Yiran Liu Junming Ke Qiuliang Xu Han Jiang Hao Wang |
| author_sort | Yiran Liu |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The blockchain is the core mechanism of Bitcoin, which is mainly enabled by a distributed consensus mechanism. Essentially, in Proof-of-Work-based consensus protocol, the miners generate a series of blocks to realize decentralization practical. Miners receive two types of revenue: block rewards and transaction fees, in which the reward of block drops off as time goes on. Carlsten et al. defined a mining gap and then Tsabary et al. analyzed the gap game exploring how mining gaps form. In this paper, we analyze the other implications of the gap game. First, it is well known that the security of Bitcoin decentralized consensus protocol relies on miners behaving correctly. The security of the blockchain system will be threatened in case of the consensus mechanism is breached. Therefore, we also described how the gap game impacts the decentralization of Bitcoin and the stability of blockchain. Second, to confirm the implication, we discuss what aspects of decentralization can be impacted by the gap game; then we defined a new decentralization model and listed its main features. In the end, we analyze the block reward capacity in the blockchain and consider the impact on the existing two common block reward systems when the gap game was formed. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-19T08:13:12Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-957d60e821cd4ae2bbabd94bdb46ee25 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2169-3536 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-19T08:13:12Z |
| publishDate | 2019-01-01 |
| publisher | IEEE |
| record_format | Article |
| series | IEEE Access |
| spelling | doaj.art-957d60e821cd4ae2bbabd94bdb46ee252022-12-21T20:29:35ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362019-01-017909999100810.1109/ACCESS.2019.29272578756129Decentralization is Vulnerable Under the Gap GameYiran Liu0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7455-9128Junming Ke1Qiuliang Xu2Han Jiang3Hao Wang4https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3472-3699School of Computer Science and Technology, Shandong University, Jinan, ChinaSchool of Computer Science and Technology, Shandong University, Jinan, ChinaSchool of Software, Shandong University, Jinan, ChinaSchool of Software, Shandong University, Jinan, ChinaSchool of Information Science and Engineering, Shandong Normal University, Jinan, ChinaThe blockchain is the core mechanism of Bitcoin, which is mainly enabled by a distributed consensus mechanism. Essentially, in Proof-of-Work-based consensus protocol, the miners generate a series of blocks to realize decentralization practical. Miners receive two types of revenue: block rewards and transaction fees, in which the reward of block drops off as time goes on. Carlsten et al. defined a mining gap and then Tsabary et al. analyzed the gap game exploring how mining gaps form. In this paper, we analyze the other implications of the gap game. First, it is well known that the security of Bitcoin decentralized consensus protocol relies on miners behaving correctly. The security of the blockchain system will be threatened in case of the consensus mechanism is breached. Therefore, we also described how the gap game impacts the decentralization of Bitcoin and the stability of blockchain. Second, to confirm the implication, we discuss what aspects of decentralization can be impacted by the gap game; then we defined a new decentralization model and listed its main features. In the end, we analyze the block reward capacity in the blockchain and consider the impact on the existing two common block reward systems when the gap game was formed.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8756129/Blockchain securitydecentralizationrewardgap gamemining |
| spellingShingle | Yiran Liu Junming Ke Qiuliang Xu Han Jiang Hao Wang Decentralization is Vulnerable Under the Gap Game IEEE Access Blockchain security decentralization reward gap game mining |
| title | Decentralization is Vulnerable Under the Gap Game |
| title_full | Decentralization is Vulnerable Under the Gap Game |
| title_fullStr | Decentralization is Vulnerable Under the Gap Game |
| title_full_unstemmed | Decentralization is Vulnerable Under the Gap Game |
| title_short | Decentralization is Vulnerable Under the Gap Game |
| title_sort | decentralization is vulnerable under the gap game |
| topic | Blockchain security decentralization reward gap game mining |
| url | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8756129/ |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT yiranliu decentralizationisvulnerableunderthegapgame AT junmingke decentralizationisvulnerableunderthegapgame AT qiuliangxu decentralizationisvulnerableunderthegapgame AT hanjiang decentralizationisvulnerableunderthegapgame AT haowang decentralizationisvulnerableunderthegapgame |