Compassionate Deism and the Grammar of Permission

Both theism and atheism assume that God permits evil. But neither theism nor atheism make this assumption with due attention to what I call, following Wittgenstein, the grammar of the term ‘permission’. When this grammar is examined, it becomes clear that this assumption cannot avoid the atheistic f...

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Main Author: Ronald Hall
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2021-03-01
Series:Religions
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/3/200
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author Ronald Hall
author_facet Ronald Hall
author_sort Ronald Hall
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description Both theism and atheism assume that God permits evil. But neither theism nor atheism make this assumption with due attention to what I call, following Wittgenstein, the grammar of the term ‘permission’. When this grammar is examined, it becomes clear that this assumption cannot avoid the atheistic force of the argument from evil. To rescue belief in God, I propose the adoption of a position I call compassionate deism. This position is a combination of Christian theism and traditional deism. The combination is produced by making a slight deistic modification of Christian theism in the direction of non-intervention, and a slight modification of deism in the direction of compassion. Such a compassionate deism denies the common assumption made by both Christian theism and atheism, namely, that God permits evil, and thus avoids the theistic denial of the reality of evil and the atheist’s denial of God’s goodness.
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spelling doaj.art-95f8a496adfc452390386bc0bcf821752023-11-21T10:50:40ZengMDPI AGReligions2077-14442021-03-0112320010.3390/rel12030200Compassionate Deism and the Grammar of PermissionRonald Hall0Department of Philosophy, Stetson University, DeLand, FL 32720, USABoth theism and atheism assume that God permits evil. But neither theism nor atheism make this assumption with due attention to what I call, following Wittgenstein, the grammar of the term ‘permission’. When this grammar is examined, it becomes clear that this assumption cannot avoid the atheistic force of the argument from evil. To rescue belief in God, I propose the adoption of a position I call compassionate deism. This position is a combination of Christian theism and traditional deism. The combination is produced by making a slight deistic modification of Christian theism in the direction of non-intervention, and a slight modification of deism in the direction of compassion. Such a compassionate deism denies the common assumption made by both Christian theism and atheism, namely, that God permits evil, and thus avoids the theistic denial of the reality of evil and the atheist’s denial of God’s goodness.https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/3/200interventionpermissiondeismcompassionWittgensteingrammar
spellingShingle Ronald Hall
Compassionate Deism and the Grammar of Permission
Religions
intervention
permission
deism
compassion
Wittgenstein
grammar
title Compassionate Deism and the Grammar of Permission
title_full Compassionate Deism and the Grammar of Permission
title_fullStr Compassionate Deism and the Grammar of Permission
title_full_unstemmed Compassionate Deism and the Grammar of Permission
title_short Compassionate Deism and the Grammar of Permission
title_sort compassionate deism and the grammar of permission
topic intervention
permission
deism
compassion
Wittgenstein
grammar
url https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/3/200
work_keys_str_mv AT ronaldhall compassionatedeismandthegrammarofpermission