Optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market: From the perspective of signaling theory
The promotion of general practitioner (GP) contract service is one of the key components of China's healthcare reform. We consider GPs providing primary health services with private competency information over two periods, where patients decide when to sign. Two types of GPs are considered: tho...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Frontiers Media S.A.
2022-10-01
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| Series: | Frontiers in Public Health |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2022.959032/full |
| _version_ | 1828100149427044352 |
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| author | Jianyue Liu Zhiqiang Ma Jialu Su Bailin Ge |
| author_facet | Jianyue Liu Zhiqiang Ma Jialu Su Bailin Ge |
| author_sort | Jianyue Liu |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The promotion of general practitioner (GP) contract service is one of the key components of China's healthcare reform. We consider GPs providing primary health services with private competency information over two periods, where patients decide when to sign. Two types of GPs are considered: those with higher and lower competency. Under asymmetric information, to spur the patients' incentive to sign, the GPs can move to offer competency disclosure schemes to patients, for example, separating or pooling, through which true competency information is revealed, respectively. We investigate three scenarios, which are referred to as “separating-separating,” “pooling-separating,” and “pooling-pooling.” The results of the three scenarios yield intriguing insights into the impact of the GP's competency disclosure decisions. Findings include that GPs prefer the “pooling-separating” strategy, but patients prefer “separating-separating.” Besides, an extremely low cure rate may enable GPs to conceal some competency information. Furthermore, low-competency GPs may exaggerate their competency level for profit, but greater efforts in disclosing competency information may result in diminished benefits. Therefore, to promote the services of GPs, the core is always to improve GPs' competency. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-11T08:24:53Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-963c091817ae41bb84fdaa06de0762a9 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2296-2565 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-11T08:24:53Z |
| publishDate | 2022-10-01 |
| publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Frontiers in Public Health |
| spelling | doaj.art-963c091817ae41bb84fdaa06de0762a92022-12-22T04:34:49ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Public Health2296-25652022-10-011010.3389/fpubh.2022.959032959032Optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market: From the perspective of signaling theoryJianyue LiuZhiqiang MaJialu SuBailin GeThe promotion of general practitioner (GP) contract service is one of the key components of China's healthcare reform. We consider GPs providing primary health services with private competency information over two periods, where patients decide when to sign. Two types of GPs are considered: those with higher and lower competency. Under asymmetric information, to spur the patients' incentive to sign, the GPs can move to offer competency disclosure schemes to patients, for example, separating or pooling, through which true competency information is revealed, respectively. We investigate three scenarios, which are referred to as “separating-separating,” “pooling-separating,” and “pooling-pooling.” The results of the three scenarios yield intriguing insights into the impact of the GP's competency disclosure decisions. Findings include that GPs prefer the “pooling-separating” strategy, but patients prefer “separating-separating.” Besides, an extremely low cure rate may enable GPs to conceal some competency information. Furthermore, low-competency GPs may exaggerate their competency level for profit, but greater efforts in disclosing competency information may result in diminished benefits. Therefore, to promote the services of GPs, the core is always to improve GPs' competency.https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2022.959032/fullgeneral practitionercompetencyinformation disclosuresignaling theoryprimary healthcare |
| spellingShingle | Jianyue Liu Zhiqiang Ma Jialu Su Bailin Ge Optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market: From the perspective of signaling theory Frontiers in Public Health general practitioner competency information disclosure signaling theory primary healthcare |
| title | Optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market: From the perspective of signaling theory |
| title_full | Optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market: From the perspective of signaling theory |
| title_fullStr | Optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market: From the perspective of signaling theory |
| title_full_unstemmed | Optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market: From the perspective of signaling theory |
| title_short | Optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market: From the perspective of signaling theory |
| title_sort | optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market from the perspective of signaling theory |
| topic | general practitioner competency information disclosure signaling theory primary healthcare |
| url | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2022.959032/full |
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