Public governance and tunneling: evidence from a quasi-experiment in China

This study aims to take advantage of the unprecedented anti-corruption campaign launched in China in December 2012 and examine the effect of improved public governance on tunneling. This study uses a sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed companies from 2010 to 2014 and conduct reg...

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Main Authors: Xiaofang Ma, Wenming Wang, Gaoguang Zhou, Jun Chen
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Emerald Publishing 2023-03-01
Series:China Accounting and Finance Review
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/CAFR-05-2022-0041/full/html
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author Xiaofang Ma
Wenming Wang
Gaoguang Zhou
Jun Chen
author_facet Xiaofang Ma
Wenming Wang
Gaoguang Zhou
Jun Chen
author_sort Xiaofang Ma
collection DOAJ
description This study aims to take advantage of the unprecedented anti-corruption campaign launched in China in December 2012 and examine the effect of improved public governance on tunneling. This study uses a sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed companies from 2010 to 2014 and conduct regression analyses to investigate the effect of improved public governance attributed to the anti-corruption campaign on tunneling. This study finds that the level of tunneling decreased significantly after the anti-corruption campaign, suggesting that increased public governance effectively curbs tunneling. Cross-sectional results show that this mitigating effect is more pronounced for non-SOE firms, especially non-SOE firms with political connections, firms audited by non-Big 8 auditors, firms with a large divergence between control rights and cash flow rights and firms located in areas with lower marketization. This study highlights the importance of anti-corruption initiatives in improving public governance and in turn reducing tunneling. This study provides important implications for many other emerging economies to improve public governance. This study contributes to the literature on the role of public governance in constraining corporate agency problems and advances the understanding of the economic consequences of China's anti-corruption campaign in the context of tunneling.
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spelling doaj.art-963e4b7e0c1f4f4dab35c0ab538df4a82023-09-15T09:18:22ZengEmerald PublishingChina Accounting and Finance Review2307-30552023-03-0125112210.1108/CAFR-05-2022-0041Public governance and tunneling: evidence from a quasi-experiment in ChinaXiaofang Ma0Wenming Wang1https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8155-5531Gaoguang Zhou2https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2298-4226Jun Chen3Zhejiang University of TechnologyZhejiang UniversityHong Kong Baptist UniversityZhejiang UniversityThis study aims to take advantage of the unprecedented anti-corruption campaign launched in China in December 2012 and examine the effect of improved public governance on tunneling. This study uses a sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed companies from 2010 to 2014 and conduct regression analyses to investigate the effect of improved public governance attributed to the anti-corruption campaign on tunneling. This study finds that the level of tunneling decreased significantly after the anti-corruption campaign, suggesting that increased public governance effectively curbs tunneling. Cross-sectional results show that this mitigating effect is more pronounced for non-SOE firms, especially non-SOE firms with political connections, firms audited by non-Big 8 auditors, firms with a large divergence between control rights and cash flow rights and firms located in areas with lower marketization. This study highlights the importance of anti-corruption initiatives in improving public governance and in turn reducing tunneling. This study provides important implications for many other emerging economies to improve public governance. This study contributes to the literature on the role of public governance in constraining corporate agency problems and advances the understanding of the economic consequences of China's anti-corruption campaign in the context of tunneling.https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/CAFR-05-2022-0041/full/htmlanti-corruptionpublic governancetunneling
spellingShingle Xiaofang Ma
Wenming Wang
Gaoguang Zhou
Jun Chen
Public governance and tunneling: evidence from a quasi-experiment in China
China Accounting and Finance Review
anti-corruption
public governance
tunneling
title Public governance and tunneling: evidence from a quasi-experiment in China
title_full Public governance and tunneling: evidence from a quasi-experiment in China
title_fullStr Public governance and tunneling: evidence from a quasi-experiment in China
title_full_unstemmed Public governance and tunneling: evidence from a quasi-experiment in China
title_short Public governance and tunneling: evidence from a quasi-experiment in China
title_sort public governance and tunneling evidence from a quasi experiment in china
topic anti-corruption
public governance
tunneling
url https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/CAFR-05-2022-0041/full/html
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