| Summary: | The Anglo-German Naval Agreement was signed on 18 June 1935 in London
through the exchange of notes between the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare
and the representative of the Third Reich, Joachim von Ribbentrop. In this agreement the
British government accepted Germany’s right to grow their Navy up to the level equalling
35% of the aggregate naval strength of the members the British Commonwealth of
Nations.
From a military perspective it meant that Germany could increase their Kriegsmarine’s
global tonnage fourfold (from 108,000 tonnes limit set in the Treaty of Versailles to
420,500 tonnes). From an official and legal point of view it meant a revision of the Treaty
of Versailles and legalisation of Adolf Hitler’s renunciation of the Part V of the Treaty of
Versailles in March 1935 by Great Britain. The political dimension highlighted a trend in
British policy to seek an agreement with Berlin through a revision of the Versailles order
within the so-called policy of Appeasement. It also meant a break in the joint British,
French and Italian front towards Germany and a move away from a policy of agreement
between western powers on revising military caveats of the Treaty of Versailles in exchange
for some concessions by Adolf Hitler (Germany’s return to the League of Nations
and to the Disarmament Conference and Germany’s accession to the regional security
pacts: the Air Pact, the Eastern Pact and the Danubian Pact.
This article presents the background to this agreement from the British point of
view and the analysis of the logic that made British government accept Hitler’s demands
and conclude the agreement on German terms.
British government signed the agreement taking into consideration political, strategic,
military and economic factors. Great Britain was not keen to react to the remilitarisation
of Germany with sanctions. London believed that concluding the agreement
on German terms is the only alternative to the unlimited growth of the Germany Navy.
British ministers considered the rejection of the German “offer” off the table due to the
view of their public opinion in the run-up to the General Election. Signing the agreement
on German terms was accepted by the British Admiralty where the deal was analysed in
a broader perspective through the lenses of the Japanese threat to the Far East. Foreign
Office, on the other hand, assumed that a bilateral agreement with Berlin would be a good
opening towards a general settlement with Germany that would embrace other elements
including the Air Pact so significant for the security of Britain.
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