The Effect of Information Sharing on Tax-to-GDP Ratio

In real world, taxpayers have private information of which tax agencies are either completely or partly not aware of. This issue gives rise to the so-called asymmetric information problem, seriously preventing tax laws from being justly and efficiently enforced. Asymmetry of information motivates ta...

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Main Authors: Zahra Ziya’i, parisa mohajeri, Ali Nasiri Aghdam
Format: Article
Language:fas
Published: Allameh Tabataba'i University Press 2016-12-01
Series:Faslnāmah-i Pizhūhish/Nāmah-i Iqtisādī
Subjects:
Online Access:https://joer.atu.ac.ir/article_7586_23efc516837528cc73b1b8417feb766a.pdf
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author Zahra Ziya’i
parisa mohajeri
Ali Nasiri Aghdam
author_facet Zahra Ziya’i
parisa mohajeri
Ali Nasiri Aghdam
author_sort Zahra Ziya’i
collection DOAJ
description In real world, taxpayers have private information of which tax agencies are either completely or partly not aware of. This issue gives rise to the so-called asymmetric information problem, seriously preventing tax laws from being justly and efficiently enforced. Asymmetry of information motivates taxpayer towards falsifying or concealing information, trying to enjoy benefits of failure to pay taxes (moral hazard); furthermore, by granting licenses to bad economic operators for operating as authorized economic operators, law-abiding companies may leave licensed and authorized market (adverse selection). It is obvious that, information sharing and availability of databases containing taxpayers’ information can help governments in recognizing and collecting taxes in a justly and fair manner. In this paper, using statistics from 92 countries during 2006 – 2012 (in the form of panel data), we have studied the effects of information sharing variables on tax-to-GDP ratio. The findings indicate that, information sharing has a positive, yet statistically insignificant, effect on the ratio, which is in agreement with theoretical foundations.
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spelling doaj.art-96d1181a03464622bb5edaab1a7421402023-12-26T08:02:57ZfasAllameh Tabataba'i University PressFaslnāmah-i Pizhūhish/Nāmah-i Iqtisādī1735-210X2476-64532016-12-01166311914610.22054/joer.2017.75867586The Effect of Information Sharing on Tax-to-GDP RatioZahra Ziya’i0parisa mohajeri1Ali Nasiri Aghdam2MSc Student in Economics, Faculty of Economics, Allameh Tabataba’i UniversityFaculty Member, Allameh Tabataba’i UniversityFaculty Member, Allameh Tabataba’i UniversityIn real world, taxpayers have private information of which tax agencies are either completely or partly not aware of. This issue gives rise to the so-called asymmetric information problem, seriously preventing tax laws from being justly and efficiently enforced. Asymmetry of information motivates taxpayer towards falsifying or concealing information, trying to enjoy benefits of failure to pay taxes (moral hazard); furthermore, by granting licenses to bad economic operators for operating as authorized economic operators, law-abiding companies may leave licensed and authorized market (adverse selection). It is obvious that, information sharing and availability of databases containing taxpayers’ information can help governments in recognizing and collecting taxes in a justly and fair manner. In this paper, using statistics from 92 countries during 2006 – 2012 (in the form of panel data), we have studied the effects of information sharing variables on tax-to-GDP ratio. The findings indicate that, information sharing has a positive, yet statistically insignificant, effect on the ratio, which is in agreement with theoretical foundations.https://joer.atu.ac.ir/article_7586_23efc516837528cc73b1b8417feb766a.pdfinformation sharingasymmetric informationmoral hazardadverse selectiontax-to-gdp ratio
spellingShingle Zahra Ziya’i
parisa mohajeri
Ali Nasiri Aghdam
The Effect of Information Sharing on Tax-to-GDP Ratio
Faslnāmah-i Pizhūhish/Nāmah-i Iqtisādī
information sharing
asymmetric information
moral hazard
adverse selection
tax-to-gdp ratio
title The Effect of Information Sharing on Tax-to-GDP Ratio
title_full The Effect of Information Sharing on Tax-to-GDP Ratio
title_fullStr The Effect of Information Sharing on Tax-to-GDP Ratio
title_full_unstemmed The Effect of Information Sharing on Tax-to-GDP Ratio
title_short The Effect of Information Sharing on Tax-to-GDP Ratio
title_sort effect of information sharing on tax to gdp ratio
topic information sharing
asymmetric information
moral hazard
adverse selection
tax-to-gdp ratio
url https://joer.atu.ac.ir/article_7586_23efc516837528cc73b1b8417feb766a.pdf
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