Post-error recklessness and the hot hand
Although post-error slowing and the “hot hand” (streaks of good performance) are both types of sequential dependencies arising from the differential influence of success and failure, they have not previously been studied together. We bring together these two streams of research in a task where diffi...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge University Press
2016-03-01
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| Series: | Judgment and Decision Making |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500007282/type/journal_article |
| _version_ | 1797697908599947264 |
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| author | Paul Williams Andrew Heathcote Keith Nesbitt Ami Eidels |
| author_facet | Paul Williams Andrew Heathcote Keith Nesbitt Ami Eidels |
| author_sort | Paul Williams |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Although post-error slowing and the “hot hand” (streaks of good performance) are both types of sequential dependencies arising from the differential influence of success and failure, they have not previously been studied together. We bring together these two streams of research in a task where difficulty can be controlled by participants delaying their decisions, and where responses required a degree deliberation, and so are relatively slow. We compared performance of unpaid participants against paid participants who were rewarded differentially, with higher reward for better performance. In contrast to most previous results, we found no post-error slowing for paid or unpaid participants. For the unpaid group, we found post-error speeding and a hot hand, even though the hot hand is typically considered a fallacy. Our results suggest that the effect of success and failure on subsequent performance may differ substantially with task characteristics and demands. We also found payment affected post-error performance; financially rewarding successful performance led to a more cautious approach following errors, whereas unrewarded performance led to recklessness following errors. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T03:46:40Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-96f7fc767e064667b31557e1f3c6d007 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1930-2975 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T03:46:40Z |
| publishDate | 2016-03-01 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Judgment and Decision Making |
| spelling | doaj.art-96f7fc767e064667b31557e1f3c6d0072023-09-03T12:44:18ZengCambridge University PressJudgment and Decision Making1930-29752016-03-011117418410.1017/S1930297500007282Post-error recklessness and the hot handPaul Williams0Andrew Heathcote1Keith Nesbitt2Ami Eidels3The University of Newcastle School of Psychology, University of Newcastle, Callaghan, NSW, 2308, AustraliaThe University of Newcastle School of Psychology, University of Newcastle, Callaghan, NSW, 2308, Australia The University of TasmaniaThe University of Newcastle School of Psychology, University of Newcastle, Callaghan, NSW, 2308, AustraliaThe University of Newcastle School of Psychology, University of Newcastle, Callaghan, NSW, 2308, AustraliaAlthough post-error slowing and the “hot hand” (streaks of good performance) are both types of sequential dependencies arising from the differential influence of success and failure, they have not previously been studied together. We bring together these two streams of research in a task where difficulty can be controlled by participants delaying their decisions, and where responses required a degree deliberation, and so are relatively slow. We compared performance of unpaid participants against paid participants who were rewarded differentially, with higher reward for better performance. In contrast to most previous results, we found no post-error slowing for paid or unpaid participants. For the unpaid group, we found post-error speeding and a hot hand, even though the hot hand is typically considered a fallacy. Our results suggest that the effect of success and failure on subsequent performance may differ substantially with task characteristics and demands. We also found payment affected post-error performance; financially rewarding successful performance led to a more cautious approach following errors, whereas unrewarded performance led to recklessness following errors.https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500007282/type/journal_articlepost-error slowinghot handcognitive controlfinancial incentives |
| spellingShingle | Paul Williams Andrew Heathcote Keith Nesbitt Ami Eidels Post-error recklessness and the hot hand Judgment and Decision Making post-error slowing hot hand cognitive control financial incentives |
| title | Post-error recklessness and the hot hand |
| title_full | Post-error recklessness and the hot hand |
| title_fullStr | Post-error recklessness and the hot hand |
| title_full_unstemmed | Post-error recklessness and the hot hand |
| title_short | Post-error recklessness and the hot hand |
| title_sort | post error recklessness and the hot hand |
| topic | post-error slowing hot hand cognitive control financial incentives |
| url | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500007282/type/journal_article |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT paulwilliams posterrorrecklessnessandthehothand AT andrewheathcote posterrorrecklessnessandthehothand AT keithnesbitt posterrorrecklessnessandthehothand AT amieidels posterrorrecklessnessandthehothand |