The Consequences of the Distribution of Natural Resources (land and water) In The Political and Social Structure Based on State Rent Management Theory Case Study: The Middle of the Naseroddin Shah Period to Constitutional Revolution
This paper intends to analyze the consequences of the distribution of natural resources (land and water) in the political and social structure, to present rent management theory as an alternative approach to explaining some of the historical events and the political and social issues of Iran. The ma...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | fas |
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Allameh Tabataba'i University Press
2019-02-01
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| Series: | دولتپژوهی |
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| Online Access: | https://tssq.atu.ac.ir/article_9592_d1bfcb5025b351c895e8737ec31c5005.pdf |
| _version_ | 1797386120619622400 |
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| author | Shayan Karami |
| author_facet | Shayan Karami |
| author_sort | Shayan Karami |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This paper intends to analyze the consequences of the distribution of natural resources (land and water) in the political and social structure, to present rent management theory as an alternative approach to explaining some of the historical events and the political and social issues of Iran. The main issue of the paper is the explanation of the consequences of the distribution of the natural resources in Iran during the Qajar period. The data was collected from the National Documents Archives and other library resources, and by historical method, the rent analysis was analyzed. The findings show that, in Iran's economic history, the government is placed as the largest distributor of natural resources (land and water) on the supply side, and society (capital and labor) is placed as the largest consumer, on the demand side. The structure of political and social institutions, based on the model of the implementation of social justice, in the distribution of natural resources, monolithically consolidates. This pattern has been one of the main factors behind the creation of rents and the establishment of rents management institution in the government. During the Qajar period, Thiol, conversion, the difference in prices and the salaries and wages of the princes, have been the most important channels for the distribution of rents, split from the rent government agency. These canals were blocked after the Constitutional Revolution, with the decisive action of the first parliament. The state rent agency was one of the main factors in the ineffectiveness of the tax system, the continued decline in government revenue, and the prevalence of bribes and corruption. The ultimate goal of distributing rents has been the exemption from tax payments. Other important consequences of rents include the transfer of major economic privileges and the occurrence of a constitutional revolution. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-08T22:05:25Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-970b9bfbfcc24d54831c9fb277233fa1 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2476-2806 2476-6828 |
| language | fas |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-08T22:05:25Z |
| publishDate | 2019-02-01 |
| publisher | Allameh Tabataba'i University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | دولتپژوهی |
| spelling | doaj.art-970b9bfbfcc24d54831c9fb277233fa12023-12-19T10:28:54ZfasAllameh Tabataba'i University Pressدولتپژوهی2476-28062476-68282019-02-014167310810.22054/tssq.2020.95929592The Consequences of the Distribution of Natural Resources (land and water) In The Political and Social Structure Based on State Rent Management Theory Case Study: The Middle of the Naseroddin Shah Period to Constitutional RevolutionShayan Karami0دکتری تاریخ دانشگاه پیام نور تهرانThis paper intends to analyze the consequences of the distribution of natural resources (land and water) in the political and social structure, to present rent management theory as an alternative approach to explaining some of the historical events and the political and social issues of Iran. The main issue of the paper is the explanation of the consequences of the distribution of the natural resources in Iran during the Qajar period. The data was collected from the National Documents Archives and other library resources, and by historical method, the rent analysis was analyzed. The findings show that, in Iran's economic history, the government is placed as the largest distributor of natural resources (land and water) on the supply side, and society (capital and labor) is placed as the largest consumer, on the demand side. The structure of political and social institutions, based on the model of the implementation of social justice, in the distribution of natural resources, monolithically consolidates. This pattern has been one of the main factors behind the creation of rents and the establishment of rents management institution in the government. During the Qajar period, Thiol, conversion, the difference in prices and the salaries and wages of the princes, have been the most important channels for the distribution of rents, split from the rent government agency. These canals were blocked after the Constitutional Revolution, with the decisive action of the first parliament. The state rent agency was one of the main factors in the ineffectiveness of the tax system, the continued decline in government revenue, and the prevalence of bribes and corruption. The ultimate goal of distributing rents has been the exemption from tax payments. Other important consequences of rents include the transfer of major economic privileges and the occurrence of a constitutional revolution.https://tssq.atu.ac.ir/article_9592_d1bfcb5025b351c895e8737ec31c5005.pdfqajarroyaltyland distributionconstitutional revolution |
| spellingShingle | Shayan Karami The Consequences of the Distribution of Natural Resources (land and water) In The Political and Social Structure Based on State Rent Management Theory Case Study: The Middle of the Naseroddin Shah Period to Constitutional Revolution دولتپژوهی qajar royalty land distribution constitutional revolution |
| title | The Consequences of the Distribution of Natural Resources (land and water) In The Political and Social Structure Based on State Rent Management Theory
Case Study: The Middle of the Naseroddin Shah Period to Constitutional Revolution |
| title_full | The Consequences of the Distribution of Natural Resources (land and water) In The Political and Social Structure Based on State Rent Management Theory
Case Study: The Middle of the Naseroddin Shah Period to Constitutional Revolution |
| title_fullStr | The Consequences of the Distribution of Natural Resources (land and water) In The Political and Social Structure Based on State Rent Management Theory
Case Study: The Middle of the Naseroddin Shah Period to Constitutional Revolution |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Consequences of the Distribution of Natural Resources (land and water) In The Political and Social Structure Based on State Rent Management Theory
Case Study: The Middle of the Naseroddin Shah Period to Constitutional Revolution |
| title_short | The Consequences of the Distribution of Natural Resources (land and water) In The Political and Social Structure Based on State Rent Management Theory
Case Study: The Middle of the Naseroddin Shah Period to Constitutional Revolution |
| title_sort | consequences of the distribution of natural resources land and water in the political and social structure based on state rent management theory case study the middle of the naseroddin shah period to constitutional revolution |
| topic | qajar royalty land distribution constitutional revolution |
| url | https://tssq.atu.ac.ir/article_9592_d1bfcb5025b351c895e8737ec31c5005.pdf |
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