An economic analysis of the political promotion system in China
This paper mainly discusses the political promotion system in China. Specifically, we develop a generalized analytical framework by introducing the contest success function. On the one hand, the central government can give the optimal political promotion benefits to local officials to incentivize...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
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Faculty of Economics University of Rijeka
2017-12-01
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| Series: | Zbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci : časopis za ekonomsku teoriju i praksu |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.efri.uniri.hr/sites/efri.uniri.hr/files/cr-collections/2/08-pi-2017-2-1513970400.pdf |
| _version_ | 1818264324906418176 |
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| author | Jiancai Pi |
| author_facet | Jiancai Pi |
| author_sort | Jiancai Pi |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This paper mainly discusses the political promotion system in China. Specifically,
we develop a generalized analytical framework by introducing the contest success
function. On the one hand, the central government can give the optimal political
promotion benefits to local officials to incentivize them to exert desirable
developmental efforts. On the other hand, the central government can undertake a
further design of the political promotion system to motivate local officials via its
assigned incentive strengths to the corresponding group and other groups, or via
its stipulated number of comparable regions in the corresponding group. Our main
findings in terms of the local official’s assigned weight to the political benefit are
as follows. First, the individual developmental effort and the summed
developmental efforts are increasing in the local official’s assigned weight to the
political benefit. Second, the central government’s assigned incentive strength to
other groups is increasing in the local official’s assigned weight to the political
benefit. Third, the central government’s assigned incentive strength to the
corresponding group is decreasing in the local official’s assigned weight to the
political benefit. Fourth, the number of comparable regions in the corresponding
group is decreasing in the local official’s assigned weight to the political benefit. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-12T19:33:07Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-9837aac9413a4a0dac9a4f4a369134da |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1331-8004 1846-7520 |
| language | deu |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-12T19:33:07Z |
| publishDate | 2017-12-01 |
| publisher | Faculty of Economics University of Rijeka |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Zbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci : časopis za ekonomsku teoriju i praksu |
| spelling | doaj.art-9837aac9413a4a0dac9a4f4a369134da2022-12-22T00:14:22ZdeuFaculty of Economics University of RijekaZbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci : časopis za ekonomsku teoriju i praksu1331-80041846-75202017-12-0135237539010.18045/zbefri.2017.2.375An economic analysis of the political promotion system in ChinaJiancai Pi0Full Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, School of Business, Nanjing University, 22 Hankou Road, Nanjing 210093, China.This paper mainly discusses the political promotion system in China. Specifically, we develop a generalized analytical framework by introducing the contest success function. On the one hand, the central government can give the optimal political promotion benefits to local officials to incentivize them to exert desirable developmental efforts. On the other hand, the central government can undertake a further design of the political promotion system to motivate local officials via its assigned incentive strengths to the corresponding group and other groups, or via its stipulated number of comparable regions in the corresponding group. Our main findings in terms of the local official’s assigned weight to the political benefit are as follows. First, the individual developmental effort and the summed developmental efforts are increasing in the local official’s assigned weight to the political benefit. Second, the central government’s assigned incentive strength to other groups is increasing in the local official’s assigned weight to the political benefit. Third, the central government’s assigned incentive strength to the corresponding group is decreasing in the local official’s assigned weight to the political benefit. Fourth, the number of comparable regions in the corresponding group is decreasing in the local official’s assigned weight to the political benefit.https://www.efri.uniri.hr/sites/efri.uniri.hr/files/cr-collections/2/08-pi-2017-2-1513970400.pdfpolitical promotionChina miraclecontest success functionpromotionlocal officialpromotion tournament modellocal official |
| spellingShingle | Jiancai Pi An economic analysis of the political promotion system in China Zbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci : časopis za ekonomsku teoriju i praksu political promotion China miracle contest success function promotion local official promotion tournament model local official |
| title | An economic analysis of the political promotion system in China |
| title_full | An economic analysis of the political promotion system in China |
| title_fullStr | An economic analysis of the political promotion system in China |
| title_full_unstemmed | An economic analysis of the political promotion system in China |
| title_short | An economic analysis of the political promotion system in China |
| title_sort | economic analysis of the political promotion system in china |
| topic | political promotion China miracle contest success function promotion local official promotion tournament model local official |
| url | https://www.efri.uniri.hr/sites/efri.uniri.hr/files/cr-collections/2/08-pi-2017-2-1513970400.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT jiancaipi aneconomicanalysisofthepoliticalpromotionsysteminchina AT jiancaipi economicanalysisofthepoliticalpromotionsysteminchina |