The (Ab)use of Soft Law in Shaping EU Competition Law: Undermining the Effectiveness of Leniency Programmes
One of the defining features of EU competition provisions is that they are enforceable and applicable by the authorities and courts of the European Union and those of its Member States. The European Commission and national competition authorities participate in the application of EU competition law...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
University of Warsaw
2021-12-01
|
| Series: | Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://yars.wz.uw.edu.pl/images/yars2021_14_24/YARS_1424_6Carames.pdf |
| Summary: | One of the defining features of EU competition provisions is that they are enforceable and applicable by the authorities and courts of the European Union and those of its Member States. The European Commission and national competition authorities participate in the application of EU competition law to differing degrees. Different legal mechanisms are adopted to apply Article 101 TFEU, including leniency programmes aimed at pursuing cartels, considered to be the greatest risk to free competition in the European Union. These programmes are implemented using non-binding mechanisms of soft law, which has generated a number of issues for the European Commission and the administrative competition authorities of the Member States when applying European and national competition laws. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1689-9024 2545-0115 |