A Defence of a Rationalist Conception of Practical Reason
In this paper I attempt to refute the instrumental conception of practical reason, and thus defend a rationalist conception of practical reason. I argue that, far from merely playing an instrumental role, reason can be used by an agent to evaluate, that is, to approve or reject, final ends, which mi...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
2017-12-01
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| Series: | European Journal of Analytic Philosophy |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://hrcak.srce.hr/188212 |
| _version_ | 1818234442085302272 |
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| author | Gal Yehezkel |
| author_facet | Gal Yehezkel |
| author_sort | Gal Yehezkel |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In this paper I attempt to refute the instrumental conception of practical reason, and thus defend a rationalist conception of practical reason. I argue that, far from merely playing an instrumental role, reason can be used by an agent to evaluate, that is, to approve or reject, final ends, which might be suggested by desires, and further to determine final ends independently of any desires, whether actual or potential, that the agent might have. My argument relies on an analysis of the concept of intention, and, more specifically, on the distinction between want and intention. I argue that the notion of an intentional action entails that reason can be used to evaluate and determine final ends. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-12T11:38:08Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-986136fbc73242bda414549a3e15cfe5 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1845-8475 1845-8475 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-12T11:38:08Z |
| publishDate | 2017-12-01 |
| publisher | University of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences |
| record_format | Article |
| series | European Journal of Analytic Philosophy |
| spelling | doaj.art-986136fbc73242bda414549a3e15cfe52022-12-22T00:25:37ZengUniversity of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social SciencesEuropean Journal of Analytic Philosophy1845-84751845-84752017-12-01131395710.31820/ejap.13.1.3A Defence of a Rationalist Conception of Practical ReasonGal Yehezkel0Sapir Academic College and the Open University of IsraelIn this paper I attempt to refute the instrumental conception of practical reason, and thus defend a rationalist conception of practical reason. I argue that, far from merely playing an instrumental role, reason can be used by an agent to evaluate, that is, to approve or reject, final ends, which might be suggested by desires, and further to determine final ends independently of any desires, whether actual or potential, that the agent might have. My argument relies on an analysis of the concept of intention, and, more specifically, on the distinction between want and intention. I argue that the notion of an intentional action entails that reason can be used to evaluate and determine final ends.https://hrcak.srce.hr/188212endinstrumental reasonintentionpractical reasonreason |
| spellingShingle | Gal Yehezkel A Defence of a Rationalist Conception of Practical Reason European Journal of Analytic Philosophy end instrumental reason intention practical reason reason |
| title | A Defence of a Rationalist Conception of Practical Reason |
| title_full | A Defence of a Rationalist Conception of Practical Reason |
| title_fullStr | A Defence of a Rationalist Conception of Practical Reason |
| title_full_unstemmed | A Defence of a Rationalist Conception of Practical Reason |
| title_short | A Defence of a Rationalist Conception of Practical Reason |
| title_sort | defence of a rationalist conception of practical reason |
| topic | end instrumental reason intention practical reason reason |
| url | https://hrcak.srce.hr/188212 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT galyehezkel adefenceofarationalistconceptionofpracticalreason AT galyehezkel defenceofarationalistconceptionofpracticalreason |