Inability and Obligation in Moral Judgment.
It is often thought that judgments about what we ought to do are limited by judgments about what we can do, or that "ought implies can." We conducted eight experiments to test the link between a range of moral requirements and abilities in ordinary moral evaluations. Moral obligations were...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Public Library of Science (PLoS)
2015-01-01
|
| Series: | PLoS ONE |
| Online Access: | http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC4546617?pdf=render |
| _version_ | 1819238307182149632 |
|---|---|
| author | Wesley Buckwalter John Turri |
| author_facet | Wesley Buckwalter John Turri |
| author_sort | Wesley Buckwalter |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | It is often thought that judgments about what we ought to do are limited by judgments about what we can do, or that "ought implies can." We conducted eight experiments to test the link between a range of moral requirements and abilities in ordinary moral evaluations. Moral obligations were repeatedly attributed in tandem with inability, regardless of the type (Experiments 1-3), temporal duration (Experiment 5), or scope (Experiment 6) of inability. This pattern was consistently observed using a variety of moral vocabulary to probe moral judgments and was insensitive to different levels of seriousness for the consequences of inaction (Experiment 4). Judgments about moral obligation were no different for individuals who can or cannot perform physical actions, and these judgments differed from evaluations of a non-moral obligation (Experiment 7). Together these results demonstrate that commonsense morality rejects the "ought implies can" principle for moral requirements, and that judgments about moral obligation are made independently of considerations about ability. By contrast, judgments of blame were highly sensitive to considerations about ability (Experiment 8), which suggests that commonsense morality might accept a "blame implies can" principle. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-23T13:34:08Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-987082f146554f34ab331eb35c723827 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1932-6203 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-23T13:34:08Z |
| publishDate | 2015-01-01 |
| publisher | Public Library of Science (PLoS) |
| record_format | Article |
| series | PLoS ONE |
| spelling | doaj.art-987082f146554f34ab331eb35c7238272022-12-21T17:45:05ZengPublic Library of Science (PLoS)PLoS ONE1932-62032015-01-01108e013658910.1371/journal.pone.0136589Inability and Obligation in Moral Judgment.Wesley BuckwalterJohn TurriIt is often thought that judgments about what we ought to do are limited by judgments about what we can do, or that "ought implies can." We conducted eight experiments to test the link between a range of moral requirements and abilities in ordinary moral evaluations. Moral obligations were repeatedly attributed in tandem with inability, regardless of the type (Experiments 1-3), temporal duration (Experiment 5), or scope (Experiment 6) of inability. This pattern was consistently observed using a variety of moral vocabulary to probe moral judgments and was insensitive to different levels of seriousness for the consequences of inaction (Experiment 4). Judgments about moral obligation were no different for individuals who can or cannot perform physical actions, and these judgments differed from evaluations of a non-moral obligation (Experiment 7). Together these results demonstrate that commonsense morality rejects the "ought implies can" principle for moral requirements, and that judgments about moral obligation are made independently of considerations about ability. By contrast, judgments of blame were highly sensitive to considerations about ability (Experiment 8), which suggests that commonsense morality might accept a "blame implies can" principle.http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC4546617?pdf=render |
| spellingShingle | Wesley Buckwalter John Turri Inability and Obligation in Moral Judgment. PLoS ONE |
| title | Inability and Obligation in Moral Judgment. |
| title_full | Inability and Obligation in Moral Judgment. |
| title_fullStr | Inability and Obligation in Moral Judgment. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Inability and Obligation in Moral Judgment. |
| title_short | Inability and Obligation in Moral Judgment. |
| title_sort | inability and obligation in moral judgment |
| url | http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC4546617?pdf=render |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT wesleybuckwalter inabilityandobligationinmoraljudgment AT johnturri inabilityandobligationinmoraljudgment |