Incoerenza temporale e indipendenza della banca centrale

According to the author, the emphasis authors currently tend to place on the 'surprise effect' in order to argue for the independence of central banks is to a large extent unjustified. The main arguments for the independence of a cen-tral bank are others: firstly, the opinion that governm...

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Main Author: Bruno Jossa
Format: Article
Language:Italian
Published: Associazione Economia civile 2012-04-01
Series:Moneta e Credito
Online Access:https://rosa.uniroma1.it/rosa04/moneta_e_credito/article/view/9678
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author Bruno Jossa
author_facet Bruno Jossa
author_sort Bruno Jossa
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description According to the author, the emphasis authors currently tend to place on the 'surprise effect' in order to argue for the independence of central banks is to a large extent unjustified. The main arguments for the independence of a cen-tral bank are others: firstly, the opinion that governments are induced to in-cur excessive expenditure due to reasons highlighted by public choice theo-rists and, secondly, the idea that inflation arises in connection with social conflict. Additionally, this study makes it clear that 'time inconsistency' theory is far from being a new way of stating old ideas.     JEL Codes: E58 Keywords:
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spelling doaj.art-9a19ed3601014d7f9aab7bf85053131a2023-02-03T16:36:56ZitaAssociazione Economia civileMoneta e Credito2037-36512012-04-0152205Incoerenza temporale e indipendenza della banca centraleBruno Jossa According to the author, the emphasis authors currently tend to place on the 'surprise effect' in order to argue for the independence of central banks is to a large extent unjustified. The main arguments for the independence of a cen-tral bank are others: firstly, the opinion that governments are induced to in-cur excessive expenditure due to reasons highlighted by public choice theo-rists and, secondly, the idea that inflation arises in connection with social conflict. Additionally, this study makes it clear that 'time inconsistency' theory is far from being a new way of stating old ideas.     JEL Codes: E58 Keywords: https://rosa.uniroma1.it/rosa04/moneta_e_credito/article/view/9678
spellingShingle Bruno Jossa
Incoerenza temporale e indipendenza della banca centrale
Moneta e Credito
title Incoerenza temporale e indipendenza della banca centrale
title_full Incoerenza temporale e indipendenza della banca centrale
title_fullStr Incoerenza temporale e indipendenza della banca centrale
title_full_unstemmed Incoerenza temporale e indipendenza della banca centrale
title_short Incoerenza temporale e indipendenza della banca centrale
title_sort incoerenza temporale e indipendenza della banca centrale
url https://rosa.uniroma1.it/rosa04/moneta_e_credito/article/view/9678
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