Incoerenza temporale e indipendenza della banca centrale
According to the author, the emphasis authors currently tend to place on the 'surprise effect' in order to argue for the independence of central banks is to a large extent unjustified. The main arguments for the independence of a cen-tral bank are others: firstly, the opinion that governm...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | Italian |
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Associazione Economia civile
2012-04-01
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Series: | Moneta e Credito |
Online Access: | https://rosa.uniroma1.it/rosa04/moneta_e_credito/article/view/9678 |
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author | Bruno Jossa |
author_facet | Bruno Jossa |
author_sort | Bruno Jossa |
collection | DOAJ |
description |
According to the author, the emphasis authors currently tend to place on the 'surprise effect' in order to argue for the independence of central banks is to a large extent unjustified. The main arguments for the independence of a cen-tral bank are others: firstly, the opinion that governments are induced to in-cur excessive expenditure due to reasons highlighted by public choice theo-rists and, secondly, the idea that inflation arises in connection with social conflict. Additionally, this study makes it clear that 'time inconsistency' theory is far from being a new way of stating old ideas.
JEL Codes: E58
Keywords:
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first_indexed | 2024-04-10T17:36:59Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-9a19ed3601014d7f9aab7bf85053131a |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 2037-3651 |
language | Italian |
last_indexed | 2024-04-10T17:36:59Z |
publishDate | 2012-04-01 |
publisher | Associazione Economia civile |
record_format | Article |
series | Moneta e Credito |
spelling | doaj.art-9a19ed3601014d7f9aab7bf85053131a2023-02-03T16:36:56ZitaAssociazione Economia civileMoneta e Credito2037-36512012-04-0152205Incoerenza temporale e indipendenza della banca centraleBruno Jossa According to the author, the emphasis authors currently tend to place on the 'surprise effect' in order to argue for the independence of central banks is to a large extent unjustified. The main arguments for the independence of a cen-tral bank are others: firstly, the opinion that governments are induced to in-cur excessive expenditure due to reasons highlighted by public choice theo-rists and, secondly, the idea that inflation arises in connection with social conflict. Additionally, this study makes it clear that 'time inconsistency' theory is far from being a new way of stating old ideas. JEL Codes: E58 Keywords: https://rosa.uniroma1.it/rosa04/moneta_e_credito/article/view/9678 |
spellingShingle | Bruno Jossa Incoerenza temporale e indipendenza della banca centrale Moneta e Credito |
title | Incoerenza temporale e indipendenza della banca centrale |
title_full | Incoerenza temporale e indipendenza della banca centrale |
title_fullStr | Incoerenza temporale e indipendenza della banca centrale |
title_full_unstemmed | Incoerenza temporale e indipendenza della banca centrale |
title_short | Incoerenza temporale e indipendenza della banca centrale |
title_sort | incoerenza temporale e indipendenza della banca centrale |
url | https://rosa.uniroma1.it/rosa04/moneta_e_credito/article/view/9678 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT brunojossa incoerenzatemporaleeindipendenzadellabancacentrale |