The Good as a Perceptual Object of Passions in Aristotelian Moral Epistemology

Aristotelian Ethics enjoyed a conscious revival from the 70’s and its influence extends to the contemporary debate. In recent years, many scholars have been able to capitalize on the moral performance of Aristotle’s philosophy, precisely because of the unique relevance that passions have in their et...

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Main Author: Diego S. Garrocho Salcedo
Format: Article
Language:Spanish
Published: Universidad Pontificia Comillas 2017-05-01
Series:Pensamiento. Revista de Investigación e Información Filosófica
Subjects:
Online Access:https://revistas.upcomillas.es/index.php/pensamiento/article/view/7834
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author Diego S. Garrocho Salcedo
author_facet Diego S. Garrocho Salcedo
author_sort Diego S. Garrocho Salcedo
collection DOAJ
description Aristotelian Ethics enjoyed a conscious revival from the 70’s and its influence extends to the contemporary debate. In recent years, many scholars have been able to capitalize on the moral performance of Aristotle’s philosophy, precisely because of the unique relevance that passions have in their ethical proposal. Many of the apparent aporias of his approaches (such as the cognitive-behavioral characterization of incontinence or the practical syllogism status itself) can be solved by analyzing the epistemological and motivational link between knowledge, passions, and moral action. To this end in this article (being in line with proposals already classic like those of M.C. Nussbaum, or more recent ones such as those of D. Achtenberg) we may try to articulate precisely the way in which the capture or estimation that the passions exert is determinant for the whole of Aristotelian ethics circumscribing us, specifically, to the capture of the idea of the Good.
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spelling doaj.art-9a8020302ca14f6188e073dc31808a0a2022-12-21T17:30:39ZspaUniversidad Pontificia ComillasPensamiento. Revista de Investigación e Información Filosófica0031-47492386-58222017-05-0173275456010.14422/pen.v73.i275.y2017.0037451The Good as a Perceptual Object of Passions in Aristotelian Moral EpistemologyDiego S. Garrocho Salcedo0Universidad Autónoma de MadridAristotelian Ethics enjoyed a conscious revival from the 70’s and its influence extends to the contemporary debate. In recent years, many scholars have been able to capitalize on the moral performance of Aristotle’s philosophy, precisely because of the unique relevance that passions have in their ethical proposal. Many of the apparent aporias of his approaches (such as the cognitive-behavioral characterization of incontinence or the practical syllogism status itself) can be solved by analyzing the epistemological and motivational link between knowledge, passions, and moral action. To this end in this article (being in line with proposals already classic like those of M.C. Nussbaum, or more recent ones such as those of D. Achtenberg) we may try to articulate precisely the way in which the capture or estimation that the passions exert is determinant for the whole of Aristotelian ethics circumscribing us, specifically, to the capture of the idea of the Good.https://revistas.upcomillas.es/index.php/pensamiento/article/view/7834Aristóteleséticapasionesacciónbienconocimiento moral
spellingShingle Diego S. Garrocho Salcedo
The Good as a Perceptual Object of Passions in Aristotelian Moral Epistemology
Pensamiento. Revista de Investigación e Información Filosófica
Aristóteles
ética
pasiones
acción
bien
conocimiento moral
title The Good as a Perceptual Object of Passions in Aristotelian Moral Epistemology
title_full The Good as a Perceptual Object of Passions in Aristotelian Moral Epistemology
title_fullStr The Good as a Perceptual Object of Passions in Aristotelian Moral Epistemology
title_full_unstemmed The Good as a Perceptual Object of Passions in Aristotelian Moral Epistemology
title_short The Good as a Perceptual Object of Passions in Aristotelian Moral Epistemology
title_sort good as a perceptual object of passions in aristotelian moral epistemology
topic Aristóteles
ética
pasiones
acción
bien
conocimiento moral
url https://revistas.upcomillas.es/index.php/pensamiento/article/view/7834
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