The Good as a Perceptual Object of Passions in Aristotelian Moral Epistemology
Aristotelian Ethics enjoyed a conscious revival from the 70’s and its influence extends to the contemporary debate. In recent years, many scholars have been able to capitalize on the moral performance of Aristotle’s philosophy, precisely because of the unique relevance that passions have in their et...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | Spanish |
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Universidad Pontificia Comillas
2017-05-01
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Series: | Pensamiento. Revista de Investigación e Información Filosófica |
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Online Access: | https://revistas.upcomillas.es/index.php/pensamiento/article/view/7834 |
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author | Diego S. Garrocho Salcedo |
author_facet | Diego S. Garrocho Salcedo |
author_sort | Diego S. Garrocho Salcedo |
collection | DOAJ |
description | Aristotelian Ethics enjoyed a conscious revival from the 70’s and its influence extends to the contemporary debate. In recent years, many scholars have been able to capitalize on the moral performance of Aristotle’s philosophy, precisely because of the unique relevance that passions have in their ethical proposal. Many of the apparent aporias of his approaches (such as the cognitive-behavioral characterization of incontinence or the practical syllogism status itself) can be solved by analyzing the epistemological and motivational link between knowledge, passions, and moral action. To this end in this article (being in line with proposals already classic like those of M.C. Nussbaum, or more recent ones such as those of D. Achtenberg) we may try to articulate precisely the way in which the capture or estimation that the passions exert is determinant for the whole of Aristotelian ethics circumscribing us, specifically, to the capture of the idea of the Good. |
first_indexed | 2024-12-23T21:24:58Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-9a8020302ca14f6188e073dc31808a0a |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 0031-4749 2386-5822 |
language | Spanish |
last_indexed | 2024-12-23T21:24:58Z |
publishDate | 2017-05-01 |
publisher | Universidad Pontificia Comillas |
record_format | Article |
series | Pensamiento. Revista de Investigación e Información Filosófica |
spelling | doaj.art-9a8020302ca14f6188e073dc31808a0a2022-12-21T17:30:39ZspaUniversidad Pontificia ComillasPensamiento. Revista de Investigación e Información Filosófica0031-47492386-58222017-05-0173275456010.14422/pen.v73.i275.y2017.0037451The Good as a Perceptual Object of Passions in Aristotelian Moral EpistemologyDiego S. Garrocho Salcedo0Universidad Autónoma de MadridAristotelian Ethics enjoyed a conscious revival from the 70’s and its influence extends to the contemporary debate. In recent years, many scholars have been able to capitalize on the moral performance of Aristotle’s philosophy, precisely because of the unique relevance that passions have in their ethical proposal. Many of the apparent aporias of his approaches (such as the cognitive-behavioral characterization of incontinence or the practical syllogism status itself) can be solved by analyzing the epistemological and motivational link between knowledge, passions, and moral action. To this end in this article (being in line with proposals already classic like those of M.C. Nussbaum, or more recent ones such as those of D. Achtenberg) we may try to articulate precisely the way in which the capture or estimation that the passions exert is determinant for the whole of Aristotelian ethics circumscribing us, specifically, to the capture of the idea of the Good.https://revistas.upcomillas.es/index.php/pensamiento/article/view/7834Aristóteleséticapasionesacciónbienconocimiento moral |
spellingShingle | Diego S. Garrocho Salcedo The Good as a Perceptual Object of Passions in Aristotelian Moral Epistemology Pensamiento. Revista de Investigación e Información Filosófica Aristóteles ética pasiones acción bien conocimiento moral |
title | The Good as a Perceptual Object of Passions in Aristotelian Moral Epistemology |
title_full | The Good as a Perceptual Object of Passions in Aristotelian Moral Epistemology |
title_fullStr | The Good as a Perceptual Object of Passions in Aristotelian Moral Epistemology |
title_full_unstemmed | The Good as a Perceptual Object of Passions in Aristotelian Moral Epistemology |
title_short | The Good as a Perceptual Object of Passions in Aristotelian Moral Epistemology |
title_sort | good as a perceptual object of passions in aristotelian moral epistemology |
topic | Aristóteles ética pasiones acción bien conocimiento moral |
url | https://revistas.upcomillas.es/index.php/pensamiento/article/view/7834 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT diegosgarrochosalcedo thegoodasaperceptualobjectofpassionsinaristotelianmoralepistemology AT diegosgarrochosalcedo goodasaperceptualobjectofpassionsinaristotelianmoralepistemology |