Backdoor Bargaining: How the European Union Navigates the Food Aid Regime Complex
Scholars have long observed that states play off overlapping international institutions against one another in an effort to advance their policy objectives. This article identifies a strategy utilized by the EU in response to regime complexity that I term “backdoor bargaining.” Unlike forum-shopping...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Cogitatio
2023-04-01
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| Series: | Politics and Governance |
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| Online Access: | https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/6307 |
| _version_ | 1797838995250479104 |
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| author | Matias E. Margulis |
| author_facet | Matias E. Margulis |
| author_sort | Matias E. Margulis |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Scholars have long observed that states play off overlapping international institutions against one another in an effort to advance their policy objectives. This article identifies a strategy utilized by the EU in response to regime complexity that I term “backdoor bargaining.” Unlike forum-shopping, regime-shifting, and competitive-regime creation strategies, which states use to move multilateral negotiations to an institution that they expect will produce a more favorable outcome, backdoor bargaining involves a state using negotiations within one institution to gain an advantage in negotiations taking place at another distinct institution in a regime complex. I demonstrate the plausibility of backdoor bargaining by showing that the EU used the renegotiation of the Food Aid Convention as a strategy to gain bargaining leverage in the agriculture negotiations at the World Trade Organization. The article also offers insights into the potential consequences of international regime complexity for the EU as a global actor and the coherence of its foreign policies. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-09T15:51:00Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-9adb098cb7804045883f92156c218ae0 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2183-2463 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-09T15:51:00Z |
| publishDate | 2023-04-01 |
| publisher | Cogitatio |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Politics and Governance |
| spelling | doaj.art-9adb098cb7804045883f92156c218ae02023-04-26T09:35:07ZengCogitatioPolitics and Governance2183-24632023-04-01112293810.17645/pag.v11i2.63072908Backdoor Bargaining: How the European Union Navigates the Food Aid Regime ComplexMatias E. Margulis0School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, University of British Columbia, CanadaScholars have long observed that states play off overlapping international institutions against one another in an effort to advance their policy objectives. This article identifies a strategy utilized by the EU in response to regime complexity that I term “backdoor bargaining.” Unlike forum-shopping, regime-shifting, and competitive-regime creation strategies, which states use to move multilateral negotiations to an institution that they expect will produce a more favorable outcome, backdoor bargaining involves a state using negotiations within one institution to gain an advantage in negotiations taking place at another distinct institution in a regime complex. I demonstrate the plausibility of backdoor bargaining by showing that the EU used the renegotiation of the Food Aid Convention as a strategy to gain bargaining leverage in the agriculture negotiations at the World Trade Organization. The article also offers insights into the potential consequences of international regime complexity for the EU as a global actor and the coherence of its foreign policies.https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/6307european unionfood aid conventioninternational negotiationpolicy coherenceregime complexestradeworld trade organization |
| spellingShingle | Matias E. Margulis Backdoor Bargaining: How the European Union Navigates the Food Aid Regime Complex Politics and Governance european union food aid convention international negotiation policy coherence regime complexes trade world trade organization |
| title | Backdoor Bargaining: How the European Union Navigates the Food Aid Regime Complex |
| title_full | Backdoor Bargaining: How the European Union Navigates the Food Aid Regime Complex |
| title_fullStr | Backdoor Bargaining: How the European Union Navigates the Food Aid Regime Complex |
| title_full_unstemmed | Backdoor Bargaining: How the European Union Navigates the Food Aid Regime Complex |
| title_short | Backdoor Bargaining: How the European Union Navigates the Food Aid Regime Complex |
| title_sort | backdoor bargaining how the european union navigates the food aid regime complex |
| topic | european union food aid convention international negotiation policy coherence regime complexes trade world trade organization |
| url | https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/6307 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT matiasemargulis backdoorbargaininghowtheeuropeanunionnavigatesthefoodaidregimecomplex |