On Nash Equilibria in Non-Cooperative All-Optical Networks
We consider the problem of determining a routing in all-optical networks, in which some couples of nodes want to communicate. In particular, we study this problem from the point of view of a network provider that has to design suitable payment functions for non-cooperative agents, corresponding to t...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2021-01-01
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| Series: | Algorithms |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4893/14/1/15 |
| _version_ | 1797414259743784960 |
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| author | Vittorio Bilò Michele Flammini Luca Moscardelli |
| author_facet | Vittorio Bilò Michele Flammini Luca Moscardelli |
| author_sort | Vittorio Bilò |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | We consider the problem of determining a routing in all-optical networks, in which some couples of nodes want to communicate. In particular, we study this problem from the point of view of a network provider that has to design suitable payment functions for non-cooperative agents, corresponding to the couples of nodes wishing to communicate. The network provider aims at inducing stable routings (i.e., routings corresponding to Nash equilibria) using a low number of wavelengths. We consider three different kinds of local knowledge that agents may exploit to compute their payments, leading to three corresponding information levels. Under complete information, the network provider can design a payment function, inducing the agents to reach a Nash equilibrium mirroring any desired routing. If the price to an agent is computed only as a function of the wavelengths used along connecting paths (minimal level) or edges (intermediate level), the most reasonable functions either do not admit Nash equilibria or admit very inefficient ones, i.e., with the largest possible price of anarchy. However, by suitably restricting the network topology, a constant price of anarchy for chains and rings and a logarithmic one for trees can be obtained under the minimal and intermediate levels, respectively. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-09T05:30:27Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-9b656bb44e0947c2b01cc48313924b98 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1999-4893 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-09T05:30:27Z |
| publishDate | 2021-01-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Algorithms |
| spelling | doaj.art-9b656bb44e0947c2b01cc48313924b982023-12-03T12:33:36ZengMDPI AGAlgorithms1999-48932021-01-011411510.3390/a14010015On Nash Equilibria in Non-Cooperative All-Optical NetworksVittorio Bilò0Michele Flammini1Luca Moscardelli2Dipartimento di Matematica e Fisica “Ennio De Giorgi”, University of Salento, Provinciale Lecce-Arnesano, P.O. Box 193, 73100 Lecce, ItalyGSSI Institute, Viale Francesco Crispi 7, 67100 L’Aquila, ItalyDipartimento di Economia, University of Chieti-Pescara, Viale Pindaro 42, 65125 Pescara, ItalyWe consider the problem of determining a routing in all-optical networks, in which some couples of nodes want to communicate. In particular, we study this problem from the point of view of a network provider that has to design suitable payment functions for non-cooperative agents, corresponding to the couples of nodes wishing to communicate. The network provider aims at inducing stable routings (i.e., routings corresponding to Nash equilibria) using a low number of wavelengths. We consider three different kinds of local knowledge that agents may exploit to compute their payments, leading to three corresponding information levels. Under complete information, the network provider can design a payment function, inducing the agents to reach a Nash equilibrium mirroring any desired routing. If the price to an agent is computed only as a function of the wavelengths used along connecting paths (minimal level) or edges (intermediate level), the most reasonable functions either do not admit Nash equilibria or admit very inefficient ones, i.e., with the largest possible price of anarchy. However, by suitably restricting the network topology, a constant price of anarchy for chains and rings and a logarithmic one for trees can be obtained under the minimal and intermediate levels, respectively.https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4893/14/1/15optical networksWDMpricing of optical network servicesselfish routingnash equilibriaprice of anarchy |
| spellingShingle | Vittorio Bilò Michele Flammini Luca Moscardelli On Nash Equilibria in Non-Cooperative All-Optical Networks Algorithms optical networks WDM pricing of optical network services selfish routing nash equilibria price of anarchy |
| title | On Nash Equilibria in Non-Cooperative All-Optical Networks |
| title_full | On Nash Equilibria in Non-Cooperative All-Optical Networks |
| title_fullStr | On Nash Equilibria in Non-Cooperative All-Optical Networks |
| title_full_unstemmed | On Nash Equilibria in Non-Cooperative All-Optical Networks |
| title_short | On Nash Equilibria in Non-Cooperative All-Optical Networks |
| title_sort | on nash equilibria in non cooperative all optical networks |
| topic | optical networks WDM pricing of optical network services selfish routing nash equilibria price of anarchy |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4893/14/1/15 |
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