European economic governance through fiscal rules

The European Union has been one of the most enthusiastic proponents of fiscal rules. Following the European sovereign debt crisis, the EU did not embark on a wide-scale governance reform with the aim of creating a fiscal union; rather, it started to cement the original architecture that had been bu...

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Main Author: István Benczes
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Corvinus University of Budapest 2019-11-01
Series:Köz-gazdaság
Online Access:http://retp.eu/index.php/retp/article/view/181
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author István Benczes
author_facet István Benczes
author_sort István Benczes
collection DOAJ
description The European Union has been one of the most enthusiastic proponents of fiscal rules. Following the European sovereign debt crisis, the EU did not embark on a wide-scale governance reform with the aim of creating a fiscal union; rather, it started to cement the original architecture that had been built upon fiscal rules. By applying the conceptual framework of liberal intergovernmentalism, the article argues that the choice between stronger rules on the one hand and deeper fiscal integration on the other hand has been basically determined by German preferences. With the help of the simple model of warof-attrition, the article shows that core countries managed to strengthen the rules-based economic policy framework of the EU to the extreme.
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spelling doaj.art-9b78ffa2aa0744cbb843a646868bdf5f2023-01-12T15:03:19ZengCorvinus University of BudapestKöz-gazdaság1788-06962019-11-01143European economic governance through fiscal rulesIstván Benczes The European Union has been one of the most enthusiastic proponents of fiscal rules. Following the European sovereign debt crisis, the EU did not embark on a wide-scale governance reform with the aim of creating a fiscal union; rather, it started to cement the original architecture that had been built upon fiscal rules. By applying the conceptual framework of liberal intergovernmentalism, the article argues that the choice between stronger rules on the one hand and deeper fiscal integration on the other hand has been basically determined by German preferences. With the help of the simple model of warof-attrition, the article shows that core countries managed to strengthen the rules-based economic policy framework of the EU to the extreme. http://retp.eu/index.php/retp/article/view/181
spellingShingle István Benczes
European economic governance through fiscal rules
Köz-gazdaság
title European economic governance through fiscal rules
title_full European economic governance through fiscal rules
title_fullStr European economic governance through fiscal rules
title_full_unstemmed European economic governance through fiscal rules
title_short European economic governance through fiscal rules
title_sort european economic governance through fiscal rules
url http://retp.eu/index.php/retp/article/view/181
work_keys_str_mv AT istvanbenczes europeaneconomicgovernancethroughfiscalrules