Military purges and the recurrence of civil conflict

Literature on coup-proofing often suggests that such activities reduce military effectiveness, which could provide an environment ripe for civil conflict. However, if coup-proofing is dangerous, why do leaders engage in these strategies? We argue that a specific type of coup-proofing, military purge...

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Main Authors: Jessica Maves Braithwaite, Jun Koga Sudduth
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: SAGE Publishing 2016-02-01
Series:Research & Politics
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168016630730
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author Jessica Maves Braithwaite
Jun Koga Sudduth
author_facet Jessica Maves Braithwaite
Jun Koga Sudduth
author_sort Jessica Maves Braithwaite
collection DOAJ
description Literature on coup-proofing often suggests that such activities reduce military effectiveness, which could provide an environment ripe for civil conflict. However, if coup-proofing is dangerous, why do leaders engage in these strategies? We argue that a specific type of coup-proofing, military purges, deters domestic unrest by demonstrating the strength of the regime via the removal of powerful but undesirable individuals from office. We use original data on military purges in non-democracies from 1969–2003 to assess quantitatively how this type of coup-proofing activity affects the likelihood of civil conflict recurrence. We find support for our expectation that purges of high-ranking military officials do in fact help prevent further civil conflict. Purges appear to provide real benefits to dictators seeking to preserve stability, at least in post-conflict environments.
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spelling doaj.art-9d7718fd7ef54e52b9745fb3bdf2532c2022-12-21T19:22:15ZengSAGE PublishingResearch & Politics2053-16802016-02-01310.1177/205316801663073010.1177_2053168016630730Military purges and the recurrence of civil conflictJessica Maves Braithwaite0Jun Koga Sudduth1School of Government and Public Policy, University of Arizona, USASchool of Government and Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, UKLiterature on coup-proofing often suggests that such activities reduce military effectiveness, which could provide an environment ripe for civil conflict. However, if coup-proofing is dangerous, why do leaders engage in these strategies? We argue that a specific type of coup-proofing, military purges, deters domestic unrest by demonstrating the strength of the regime via the removal of powerful but undesirable individuals from office. We use original data on military purges in non-democracies from 1969–2003 to assess quantitatively how this type of coup-proofing activity affects the likelihood of civil conflict recurrence. We find support for our expectation that purges of high-ranking military officials do in fact help prevent further civil conflict. Purges appear to provide real benefits to dictators seeking to preserve stability, at least in post-conflict environments.https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168016630730
spellingShingle Jessica Maves Braithwaite
Jun Koga Sudduth
Military purges and the recurrence of civil conflict
Research & Politics
title Military purges and the recurrence of civil conflict
title_full Military purges and the recurrence of civil conflict
title_fullStr Military purges and the recurrence of civil conflict
title_full_unstemmed Military purges and the recurrence of civil conflict
title_short Military purges and the recurrence of civil conflict
title_sort military purges and the recurrence of civil conflict
url https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168016630730
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