Military purges and the recurrence of civil conflict
Literature on coup-proofing often suggests that such activities reduce military effectiveness, which could provide an environment ripe for civil conflict. However, if coup-proofing is dangerous, why do leaders engage in these strategies? We argue that a specific type of coup-proofing, military purge...
Main Authors: | , |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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SAGE Publishing
2016-02-01
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Series: | Research & Politics |
Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168016630730 |
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author | Jessica Maves Braithwaite Jun Koga Sudduth |
author_facet | Jessica Maves Braithwaite Jun Koga Sudduth |
author_sort | Jessica Maves Braithwaite |
collection | DOAJ |
description | Literature on coup-proofing often suggests that such activities reduce military effectiveness, which could provide an environment ripe for civil conflict. However, if coup-proofing is dangerous, why do leaders engage in these strategies? We argue that a specific type of coup-proofing, military purges, deters domestic unrest by demonstrating the strength of the regime via the removal of powerful but undesirable individuals from office. We use original data on military purges in non-democracies from 1969–2003 to assess quantitatively how this type of coup-proofing activity affects the likelihood of civil conflict recurrence. We find support for our expectation that purges of high-ranking military officials do in fact help prevent further civil conflict. Purges appear to provide real benefits to dictators seeking to preserve stability, at least in post-conflict environments. |
first_indexed | 2024-12-21T00:14:42Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-9d7718fd7ef54e52b9745fb3bdf2532c |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 2053-1680 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-12-21T00:14:42Z |
publishDate | 2016-02-01 |
publisher | SAGE Publishing |
record_format | Article |
series | Research & Politics |
spelling | doaj.art-9d7718fd7ef54e52b9745fb3bdf2532c2022-12-21T19:22:15ZengSAGE PublishingResearch & Politics2053-16802016-02-01310.1177/205316801663073010.1177_2053168016630730Military purges and the recurrence of civil conflictJessica Maves Braithwaite0Jun Koga Sudduth1School of Government and Public Policy, University of Arizona, USASchool of Government and Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, UKLiterature on coup-proofing often suggests that such activities reduce military effectiveness, which could provide an environment ripe for civil conflict. However, if coup-proofing is dangerous, why do leaders engage in these strategies? We argue that a specific type of coup-proofing, military purges, deters domestic unrest by demonstrating the strength of the regime via the removal of powerful but undesirable individuals from office. We use original data on military purges in non-democracies from 1969–2003 to assess quantitatively how this type of coup-proofing activity affects the likelihood of civil conflict recurrence. We find support for our expectation that purges of high-ranking military officials do in fact help prevent further civil conflict. Purges appear to provide real benefits to dictators seeking to preserve stability, at least in post-conflict environments.https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168016630730 |
spellingShingle | Jessica Maves Braithwaite Jun Koga Sudduth Military purges and the recurrence of civil conflict Research & Politics |
title | Military purges and the recurrence of civil conflict |
title_full | Military purges and the recurrence of civil conflict |
title_fullStr | Military purges and the recurrence of civil conflict |
title_full_unstemmed | Military purges and the recurrence of civil conflict |
title_short | Military purges and the recurrence of civil conflict |
title_sort | military purges and the recurrence of civil conflict |
url | https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168016630730 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT jessicamavesbraithwaite militarypurgesandtherecurrenceofcivilconflict AT junkogasudduth militarypurgesandtherecurrenceofcivilconflict |