Counterfactual attitudes and multi-centered worlds

Counterfactual attitudes like imagining, dreaming, and wishing create a problem for the standard formal semantic theory of de re attitude ascriptions. I show how the problem can be avoided if we represent an agent's attitudinal possibilities using "multi-centered worlds", possible wo...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Dilip Ninan
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Linguistic Society of America 2012-08-01
Series:Semantics and Pragmatics
Subjects:
Online Access:http://semprag.org/article/view/2815
Description
Summary:Counterfactual attitudes like imagining, dreaming, and wishing create a problem for the standard formal semantic theory of de re attitude ascriptions. I show how the problem can be avoided if we represent an agent's attitudinal possibilities using "multi-centered worlds", possible worlds with multiple distinguished individuals, each of which represents an individual with whom the agent is acquainted. I then present a compositional semantics for de re ascriptions according to which singular terms are "assignment-sensitive" expressions and attitude verbs are "assignment shifters". http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/sp.5.5 <a href="http://semantics-online.org/sp-bib/ninan-2012-article.bib">BibTeX info</a>
ISSN:1937-8912