Don't blame me: A theory of politicians choosing policy advisors
We present a model in which an imperfectly informed politician chooses between appointing an independent expert, whose advice is revealed to voters, and a loyal expert whose advice can be concealed from voters and who can therefore be blamed for a bad outcome. The politician is privately informed ab...
Main Authors: | Arthur Fishman, Doron Klunover |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Elsevier
2023-01-01
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Series: | Journal of Government and Economics |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667319323000198 |
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