How to Analyze (Intentional) Consciousness in Terms of Meta-Belief and Temporal Awareness
The paper presents and defends a metadoxastic view on (intentional) consciousness that is novel in four respects: (1) It is motivated both by Husserl’s dynamic approach, which looks upon mental acts as momentary components of certain cognitive structures – “dynamic intentional structures” – in which...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Frontiers Media S.A.
2018-09-01
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| Series: | Frontiers in Psychology |
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| Online Access: | https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01628/full |
| _version_ | 1819111459969302528 |
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| author | Christian Beyer |
| author_facet | Christian Beyer |
| author_sort | Christian Beyer |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The paper presents and defends a metadoxastic view on (intentional) consciousness that is novel in four respects: (1) It is motivated both by Husserl’s dynamic approach, which looks upon mental acts as momentary components of certain cognitive structures – “dynamic intentional structures” – in which one and the same object is intended throughout a period of time (during which the subject’s cognitive perspective upon that object is constantly changing) and by his conception of consciousness in terms of internal time-consciousness (temporal awareness). (2) It combines a dispositionalist higher-order judgment theory about the structure of (intentional) consciousness with the claim that the contents of these judgments are such that they can be expressed by essentially indexical sentences containing the temporal indexical “now,” thus accommodating the basic role of internal time-consciousness. (3) It is immune against the “objection from lack of mental concepts” raised, e.g., by Dretske against any higher-order representation theory, as it employs counterfactuals in the framework of a disjunctive account of (intentional) consciousness. (4) It explains the unity of consciousness at a time as well as across time. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-22T03:57:58Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-9ee3693a284246df8a3a17a9c413e385 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1664-1078 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-22T03:57:58Z |
| publishDate | 2018-09-01 |
| publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Frontiers in Psychology |
| spelling | doaj.art-9ee3693a284246df8a3a17a9c413e3852022-12-21T18:39:49ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Psychology1664-10782018-09-01910.3389/fpsyg.2018.01628364391How to Analyze (Intentional) Consciousness in Terms of Meta-Belief and Temporal AwarenessChristian BeyerThe paper presents and defends a metadoxastic view on (intentional) consciousness that is novel in four respects: (1) It is motivated both by Husserl’s dynamic approach, which looks upon mental acts as momentary components of certain cognitive structures – “dynamic intentional structures” – in which one and the same object is intended throughout a period of time (during which the subject’s cognitive perspective upon that object is constantly changing) and by his conception of consciousness in terms of internal time-consciousness (temporal awareness). (2) It combines a dispositionalist higher-order judgment theory about the structure of (intentional) consciousness with the claim that the contents of these judgments are such that they can be expressed by essentially indexical sentences containing the temporal indexical “now,” thus accommodating the basic role of internal time-consciousness. (3) It is immune against the “objection from lack of mental concepts” raised, e.g., by Dretske against any higher-order representation theory, as it employs counterfactuals in the framework of a disjunctive account of (intentional) consciousness. (4) It explains the unity of consciousness at a time as well as across time.https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01628/fullconsciousnessintentionalitymetarepresentationunity of consciousnesstemporal awarenessHusserl |
| spellingShingle | Christian Beyer How to Analyze (Intentional) Consciousness in Terms of Meta-Belief and Temporal Awareness Frontiers in Psychology consciousness intentionality metarepresentation unity of consciousness temporal awareness Husserl |
| title | How to Analyze (Intentional) Consciousness in Terms of Meta-Belief and Temporal Awareness |
| title_full | How to Analyze (Intentional) Consciousness in Terms of Meta-Belief and Temporal Awareness |
| title_fullStr | How to Analyze (Intentional) Consciousness in Terms of Meta-Belief and Temporal Awareness |
| title_full_unstemmed | How to Analyze (Intentional) Consciousness in Terms of Meta-Belief and Temporal Awareness |
| title_short | How to Analyze (Intentional) Consciousness in Terms of Meta-Belief and Temporal Awareness |
| title_sort | how to analyze intentional consciousness in terms of meta belief and temporal awareness |
| topic | consciousness intentionality metarepresentation unity of consciousness temporal awareness Husserl |
| url | https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01628/full |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT christianbeyer howtoanalyzeintentionalconsciousnessintermsofmetabeliefandtemporalawareness |