Do young children track other's beliefs, or merely their perceptual access? An interactive, anticipatory measure of early theory of mind
This paper aimed to contribute to answering three questions. First, how robust and reliable are early implicit measures of false belief (FB) understanding? Second, do these measures tap FB understanding rather than simpler processes such as tracking the protagonist's perceptual access? Third, d...
Main Authors: | Pamela Barone, Lisa Wenzel, Marina Proft, Hannes Rakoczy |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
The Royal Society
2022-10-01
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Series: | Royal Society Open Science |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.211278 |
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