The Strategy Selection in Financial Fraud and Audit Supervision: A Study Based on a Three-Party Evolutionary Game Model
In recent years, financial fraud of listed internet companies has emerged one after another. Under the strategic goal of full audit coverage, the problems caused by audit failure have attracted more and more attention in China. We use the bounded rationality theory to analyze the strategy selections...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2022-09-01
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| Series: | Systems |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/10/5/173 |
| _version_ | 1797469785553895424 |
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| author | Binghui Wu Jing Yang Guanhao Fu Mengjiao Zhang |
| author_facet | Binghui Wu Jing Yang Guanhao Fu Mengjiao Zhang |
| author_sort | Binghui Wu |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In recent years, financial fraud of listed internet companies has emerged one after another. Under the strategic goal of full audit coverage, the problems caused by audit failure have attracted more and more attention in China. We use the bounded rationality theory to analyze the strategy selections of listed internet companies, accounting firms, and audit regulators, and put forward three hypotheses: the hypothesis of participants, the hypothesis of strategy selections, and the hypothesis of model parameters. Next, the three-party evolutionary game model is constructed, and only one stable equilibrium point is found. In numerical simulation analyses, we discuss the strategy selections of the three parties under the impact of different model parameters. The research framework of this paper enriches the existing research on financial fraud and audit supervision and deepens the evolutionary mechanism of three-party strategy selections. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-09T19:26:02Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-9fb425ce68c04981b7b2cb11cfaac55f |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2079-8954 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-09T19:26:02Z |
| publishDate | 2022-09-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Systems |
| spelling | doaj.art-9fb425ce68c04981b7b2cb11cfaac55f2023-11-24T02:55:28ZengMDPI AGSystems2079-89542022-09-0110517310.3390/systems10050173The Strategy Selection in Financial Fraud and Audit Supervision: A Study Based on a Three-Party Evolutionary Game ModelBinghui Wu0Jing Yang1Guanhao Fu2Mengjiao Zhang3International Business School, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi’an 710119, ChinaInternational Business School, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi’an 710119, ChinaInternational Business School, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi’an 710119, ChinaInternational Business School, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi’an 710119, ChinaIn recent years, financial fraud of listed internet companies has emerged one after another. Under the strategic goal of full audit coverage, the problems caused by audit failure have attracted more and more attention in China. We use the bounded rationality theory to analyze the strategy selections of listed internet companies, accounting firms, and audit regulators, and put forward three hypotheses: the hypothesis of participants, the hypothesis of strategy selections, and the hypothesis of model parameters. Next, the three-party evolutionary game model is constructed, and only one stable equilibrium point is found. In numerical simulation analyses, we discuss the strategy selections of the three parties under the impact of different model parameters. The research framework of this paper enriches the existing research on financial fraud and audit supervision and deepens the evolutionary mechanism of three-party strategy selections.https://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/10/5/173financial fraudaudit supervisionthree-party evolutionary game modelstrategy selection |
| spellingShingle | Binghui Wu Jing Yang Guanhao Fu Mengjiao Zhang The Strategy Selection in Financial Fraud and Audit Supervision: A Study Based on a Three-Party Evolutionary Game Model Systems financial fraud audit supervision three-party evolutionary game model strategy selection |
| title | The Strategy Selection in Financial Fraud and Audit Supervision: A Study Based on a Three-Party Evolutionary Game Model |
| title_full | The Strategy Selection in Financial Fraud and Audit Supervision: A Study Based on a Three-Party Evolutionary Game Model |
| title_fullStr | The Strategy Selection in Financial Fraud and Audit Supervision: A Study Based on a Three-Party Evolutionary Game Model |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Strategy Selection in Financial Fraud and Audit Supervision: A Study Based on a Three-Party Evolutionary Game Model |
| title_short | The Strategy Selection in Financial Fraud and Audit Supervision: A Study Based on a Three-Party Evolutionary Game Model |
| title_sort | strategy selection in financial fraud and audit supervision a study based on a three party evolutionary game model |
| topic | financial fraud audit supervision three-party evolutionary game model strategy selection |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/10/5/173 |
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