The Strategy Selection in Financial Fraud and Audit Supervision: A Study Based on a Three-Party Evolutionary Game Model
In recent years, financial fraud of listed internet companies has emerged one after another. Under the strategic goal of full audit coverage, the problems caused by audit failure have attracted more and more attention in China. We use the bounded rationality theory to analyze the strategy selections...
Main Authors: | Binghui Wu, Jing Yang, Guanhao Fu, Mengjiao Zhang |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MDPI AG
2022-09-01
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Series: | Systems |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/10/5/173 |
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