A Tax Evasion - Bribery Game: Experimental Evidence from Ukraine
This paper examines the issue of tax evasion by enterprises through underreporting activity. We develop a view of this phenomenon as an equilibrium of the game between a businessman and an imperfectly monitored supervising official, in which a businessman can hide part of his profit and offer bribe...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Università Carlo Cattaneo LIUC
2006-06-01
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| Series: | The European Journal of Comparative Economics |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://eaces.liuc.it/18242979200601/182429792006030103.pdf |
| _version_ | 1818902271839174656 |
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| author | Volodymyr Bilotkach |
| author_facet | Volodymyr Bilotkach |
| author_sort | Volodymyr Bilotkach |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This paper examines the issue of tax evasion by enterprises through underreporting activity. We develop a view of this phenomenon as an equilibrium of the game between a businessman and an imperfectly monitored supervising official, in which a businessman can hide part of his profit and offer bribe to official. We determine conditions under which such tax evasion and bribery become wide-spread in the society, resulting in shadow economy. The game is put into an experimental setting in Kiev, Ukraine, with the emphasis of spreading of the tax evasion and bribery activity in the laboratory setting. We find that once it becomes known that substantial share of subjects playing the role of supervising officials agree to accept bribes from subjects playing the role of businessmen, the latter offer bribes more aggressively. Yet, this in turn does not affect the behavior of subjects playing the role of supervising officials. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-19T20:33:00Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-9fd65e674be54c31aa0a8825ec0233a0 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1824-2979 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-19T20:33:00Z |
| publishDate | 2006-06-01 |
| publisher | Università Carlo Cattaneo LIUC |
| record_format | Article |
| series | The European Journal of Comparative Economics |
| spelling | doaj.art-9fd65e674be54c31aa0a8825ec0233a02022-12-21T20:06:38ZengUniversità Carlo Cattaneo LIUCThe European Journal of Comparative Economics1824-29792006-06-01313149A Tax Evasion - Bribery Game: Experimental Evidence from UkraineVolodymyr BilotkachThis paper examines the issue of tax evasion by enterprises through underreporting activity. We develop a view of this phenomenon as an equilibrium of the game between a businessman and an imperfectly monitored supervising official, in which a businessman can hide part of his profit and offer bribe to official. We determine conditions under which such tax evasion and bribery become wide-spread in the society, resulting in shadow economy. The game is put into an experimental setting in Kiev, Ukraine, with the emphasis of spreading of the tax evasion and bribery activity in the laboratory setting. We find that once it becomes known that substantial share of subjects playing the role of supervising officials agree to accept bribes from subjects playing the role of businessmen, the latter offer bribes more aggressively. Yet, this in turn does not affect the behavior of subjects playing the role of supervising officials.http://eaces.liuc.it/18242979200601/182429792006030103.pdfTax EvasionBriberyExperimentLearning in Games |
| spellingShingle | Volodymyr Bilotkach A Tax Evasion - Bribery Game: Experimental Evidence from Ukraine The European Journal of Comparative Economics Tax Evasion Bribery Experiment Learning in Games |
| title | A Tax Evasion - Bribery Game: Experimental Evidence from Ukraine |
| title_full | A Tax Evasion - Bribery Game: Experimental Evidence from Ukraine |
| title_fullStr | A Tax Evasion - Bribery Game: Experimental Evidence from Ukraine |
| title_full_unstemmed | A Tax Evasion - Bribery Game: Experimental Evidence from Ukraine |
| title_short | A Tax Evasion - Bribery Game: Experimental Evidence from Ukraine |
| title_sort | tax evasion bribery game experimental evidence from ukraine |
| topic | Tax Evasion Bribery Experiment Learning in Games |
| url | http://eaces.liuc.it/18242979200601/182429792006030103.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT volodymyrbilotkach ataxevasionbriberygameexperimentalevidencefromukraine AT volodymyrbilotkach taxevasionbriberygameexperimentalevidencefromukraine |