Optimal Labor Contracts with Asymmetric Information and More than Two Types of Agent
In the paper we discuss the optimal labor agreements between workers and firms in the situation of asymmetric information. Using a standard adverse selection model, we analyze the optimality of the labor contracts when it is the firm which has private information affecting the results of the contrac...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
General Association of Economists from Romania
2012-05-01
|
| Series: | Theoretical and Applied Economics |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: |
http://store.ectap.ro/articole/717.pdf
|
| _version_ | 1819057841530470400 |
|---|---|
| author | Daniela Elena MARINESCU Dumitru MARIN |
| author_facet | Daniela Elena MARINESCU Dumitru MARIN |
| author_sort | Daniela Elena MARINESCU |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In the paper we discuss the optimal labor agreements
between workers and firms in the situation of asymmetric information.
Using a standard adverse selection model, we analyze the optimality of
the labor contracts when it is the firm which has private information
affecting the results of the contractual relationship. We propose an
alternative procedure to solve the optimization problem, using the
informational rents as variables. In the last part of the paper we derive
and comment the features of the optimal labor contracts in asymmetric
information. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-21T13:45:43Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-a009f13815ee459ebf9f7bc3c58c4ad7 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1841-8678 1844-0029 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-21T13:45:43Z |
| publishDate | 2012-05-01 |
| publisher | General Association of Economists from Romania |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Theoretical and Applied Economics |
| spelling | doaj.art-a009f13815ee459ebf9f7bc3c58c4ad72022-12-21T19:01:53ZengGeneral Association of Economists from RomaniaTheoretical and Applied Economics1841-86781844-00292012-05-01XIX551818418678Optimal Labor Contracts with Asymmetric Information and More than Two Types of AgentDaniela Elena MARINESCU0Dumitru MARIN1 Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies In the paper we discuss the optimal labor agreements between workers and firms in the situation of asymmetric information. Using a standard adverse selection model, we analyze the optimality of the labor contracts when it is the firm which has private information affecting the results of the contractual relationship. We propose an alternative procedure to solve the optimization problem, using the informational rents as variables. In the last part of the paper we derive and comment the features of the optimal labor contracts in asymmetric information. http://store.ectap.ro/articole/717.pdf optimal labor contractincentivesadverse selection |
| spellingShingle | Daniela Elena MARINESCU Dumitru MARIN Optimal Labor Contracts with Asymmetric Information and More than Two Types of Agent Theoretical and Applied Economics optimal labor contract incentives adverse selection |
| title | Optimal Labor Contracts with Asymmetric Information and More than Two Types of Agent |
| title_full | Optimal Labor Contracts with Asymmetric Information and More than Two Types of Agent |
| title_fullStr | Optimal Labor Contracts with Asymmetric Information and More than Two Types of Agent |
| title_full_unstemmed | Optimal Labor Contracts with Asymmetric Information and More than Two Types of Agent |
| title_short | Optimal Labor Contracts with Asymmetric Information and More than Two Types of Agent |
| title_sort | optimal labor contracts with asymmetric information and more than two types of agent |
| topic | optimal labor contract incentives adverse selection |
| url |
http://store.ectap.ro/articole/717.pdf
|
| work_keys_str_mv | AT danielaelenamarinescu optimallaborcontractswithasymmetricinformationandmorethantwotypesofagent AT dumitrumarin optimallaborcontractswithasymmetricinformationandmorethantwotypesofagent |