Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a Real-Time Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
This paper provides a new way to identify conditional cooperation in a real-time version of the standard voluntary contribution mechanism. We define contribution cycles as the number of contributors a player waits for before committing to a further contribution, and use a permutation test on contrib...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
MDPI AG
2011-01-01
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| Series: | Games |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/2/1/1/ |
| Summary: | This paper provides a new way to identify conditional cooperation in a real-time version of the standard voluntary contribution mechanism. We define contribution cycles as the number of contributors a player waits for before committing to a further contribution, and use a permutation test on contribution cycles to assign a measure of conditional cooperation to each group play. The validity of the measures is tested in an experiment. We find that roughly 20% of the plays exhibit dynamics of conditional cooperation. Moreover, notwithstanding a decline in contributions, conditional cooperation is found to be stable over time. |
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| ISSN: | 2073-4336 |