Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a Real-Time Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
This paper provides a new way to identify conditional cooperation in a real-time version of the standard voluntary contribution mechanism. We define contribution cycles as the number of contributors a player waits for before committing to a further contribution, and use a permutation test on contrib...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
MDPI AG
2011-01-01
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| Series: | Games |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/2/1/1/ |
| _version_ | 1818114540906217472 |
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| author | M. Vittoria Levati Ro’i Zultan |
| author_facet | M. Vittoria Levati Ro’i Zultan |
| author_sort | M. Vittoria Levati |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This paper provides a new way to identify conditional cooperation in a real-time version of the standard voluntary contribution mechanism. We define contribution cycles as the number of contributors a player waits for before committing to a further contribution, and use a permutation test on contribution cycles to assign a measure of conditional cooperation to each group play. The validity of the measures is tested in an experiment. We find that roughly 20% of the plays exhibit dynamics of conditional cooperation. Moreover, notwithstanding a decline in contributions, conditional cooperation is found to be stable over time. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-11T03:52:21Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-a0a160dd760a47a1a03bdaff970074d0 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2073-4336 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-11T03:52:21Z |
| publishDate | 2011-01-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Games |
| spelling | doaj.art-a0a160dd760a47a1a03bdaff970074d02022-12-22T01:21:53ZengMDPI AGGames2073-43362011-01-012111510.3390/g2010001Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a Real-Time Voluntary Contribution MechanismM. Vittoria LevatiRo’i ZultanThis paper provides a new way to identify conditional cooperation in a real-time version of the standard voluntary contribution mechanism. We define contribution cycles as the number of contributors a player waits for before committing to a further contribution, and use a permutation test on contribution cycles to assign a measure of conditional cooperation to each group play. The validity of the measures is tested in an experiment. We find that roughly 20% of the plays exhibit dynamics of conditional cooperation. Moreover, notwithstanding a decline in contributions, conditional cooperation is found to be stable over time.http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/2/1/1/public goods gamereal-time protocolinformation feedbackconditional cooperation |
| spellingShingle | M. Vittoria Levati Ro’i Zultan Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a Real-Time Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Games public goods game real-time protocol information feedback conditional cooperation |
| title | Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a Real-Time Voluntary Contribution Mechanism |
| title_full | Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a Real-Time Voluntary Contribution Mechanism |
| title_fullStr | Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a Real-Time Voluntary Contribution Mechanism |
| title_full_unstemmed | Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a Real-Time Voluntary Contribution Mechanism |
| title_short | Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a Real-Time Voluntary Contribution Mechanism |
| title_sort | cycles of conditional cooperation in a real time voluntary contribution mechanism |
| topic | public goods game real-time protocol information feedback conditional cooperation |
| url | http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/2/1/1/ |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT mvittorialevati cyclesofconditionalcooperationinarealtimevoluntarycontributionmechanism AT roizultan cyclesofconditionalcooperationinarealtimevoluntarycontributionmechanism |