Frege’s Equivalence Thesis and Reference Failure
Frege claims that sentences of the form ‘A’ are equivalent to sentences of the form ‘it is true that A’ (The Equivalence Thesis). Frege also says that there are fictional names that fail to refer, and that sentences featuring fictional names fail to refer as a result. The thoughts such sentences exp...
Main Author: | Nathan Hawkins |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | ces |
Published: |
Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
2021-02-01
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Series: | Organon F |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/03061347orgf.2021.28109.pdf |
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