Direction des sociétés, modèle de reproduction des élites managériales et financiarisation du capitalisme allemand : Enseignements à partir d’un panel de vingt-cinq sociétés cotées
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the impact of the foreign Institutional Investors arrival in the German quoted firms’ capital structure, and the broadcast of the “Shareholder Value” discourse, on the social reproduction process of the German managerial Elites. In this sense, we have assembled a...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Association Recherche & Régulation
|
| Series: | Revue de la Régulation |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://journals.openedition.org/regulation/8959 |
| _version_ | 1797315000783601664 |
|---|---|
| author | Christopher Lantenois |
| author_facet | Christopher Lantenois |
| author_sort | Christopher Lantenois |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The aim of this paper is to evaluate the impact of the foreign Institutional Investors arrival in the German quoted firms’ capital structure, and the broadcast of the “Shareholder Value” discourse, on the social reproduction process of the German managerial Elites. In this sense, we have assembled a panel of 25 quoted firms. Our study is from 1990 to 2010. Our paper is organized in three parts. First, we will clarify two elements of pressure that the German capitalism has to bear, namely (a) the sudden arrival of the foreign Institutional Investors in the ownership capital structure, and (b) the reform of corporate governance principles. Then, we will estimate their effects on the sociology and the nomination process of the presidents by analyzing their school trail, the “in-house career” pattern, and the gap between the presidency of the management board and the presidency of the supervisory board. We will try to localize the continuities, inertias and changes. In fine, we will focus our attention upon the remuneration problematic. We are in the presence of a complex combination of inertia and change. However, the recent adoption of some market mechanisms doesn’t reveal an abrupt change. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-08T02:54:18Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-a25fe4ecf1754a81832152c79fde3f04 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1957-7796 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-08T02:54:18Z |
| publisher | Association Recherche & Régulation |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Revue de la Régulation |
| spelling | doaj.art-a25fe4ecf1754a81832152c79fde3f042024-02-13T13:02:16ZengAssociation Recherche & RégulationRevue de la Régulation1957-7796810.4000/regulation.8959Direction des sociétés, modèle de reproduction des élites managériales et financiarisation du capitalisme allemand : Enseignements à partir d’un panel de vingt-cinq sociétés cotéesChristopher LantenoisThe aim of this paper is to evaluate the impact of the foreign Institutional Investors arrival in the German quoted firms’ capital structure, and the broadcast of the “Shareholder Value” discourse, on the social reproduction process of the German managerial Elites. In this sense, we have assembled a panel of 25 quoted firms. Our study is from 1990 to 2010. Our paper is organized in three parts. First, we will clarify two elements of pressure that the German capitalism has to bear, namely (a) the sudden arrival of the foreign Institutional Investors in the ownership capital structure, and (b) the reform of corporate governance principles. Then, we will estimate their effects on the sociology and the nomination process of the presidents by analyzing their school trail, the “in-house career” pattern, and the gap between the presidency of the management board and the presidency of the supervisory board. We will try to localize the continuities, inertias and changes. In fine, we will focus our attention upon the remuneration problematic. We are in the presence of a complex combination of inertia and change. However, the recent adoption of some market mechanisms doesn’t reveal an abrupt change.https://journals.openedition.org/regulation/8959Business EliteInstitutional Investorscorporate governancein-house careercompensationGermany |
| spellingShingle | Christopher Lantenois Direction des sociétés, modèle de reproduction des élites managériales et financiarisation du capitalisme allemand : Enseignements à partir d’un panel de vingt-cinq sociétés cotées Revue de la Régulation Business Elite Institutional Investors corporate governance in-house career compensation Germany |
| title | Direction des sociétés, modèle de reproduction des élites managériales et financiarisation du capitalisme allemand : Enseignements à partir d’un panel de vingt-cinq sociétés cotées |
| title_full | Direction des sociétés, modèle de reproduction des élites managériales et financiarisation du capitalisme allemand : Enseignements à partir d’un panel de vingt-cinq sociétés cotées |
| title_fullStr | Direction des sociétés, modèle de reproduction des élites managériales et financiarisation du capitalisme allemand : Enseignements à partir d’un panel de vingt-cinq sociétés cotées |
| title_full_unstemmed | Direction des sociétés, modèle de reproduction des élites managériales et financiarisation du capitalisme allemand : Enseignements à partir d’un panel de vingt-cinq sociétés cotées |
| title_short | Direction des sociétés, modèle de reproduction des élites managériales et financiarisation du capitalisme allemand : Enseignements à partir d’un panel de vingt-cinq sociétés cotées |
| title_sort | direction des societes modele de reproduction des elites manageriales et financiarisation du capitalisme allemand enseignements a partir d un panel de vingt cinq societes cotees |
| topic | Business Elite Institutional Investors corporate governance in-house career compensation Germany |
| url | https://journals.openedition.org/regulation/8959 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT christopherlantenois directiondessocietesmodeledereproductiondeselitesmanagerialesetfinanciarisationducapitalismeallemandenseignementsapartirdunpaneldevingtcinqsocietescotees |