Foreign Law, Democracy, and Constitutional Interpretation: A German-American Comparison

Democracy is usually relied upon as an important argument against the excessive influence of international and foreign law on the domestic legal order, and especially on domestic constitutional law. Both in Germany and the United States, skeptics and opponents of the Europeanization or international...

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Main Author: Shu-Perng Hwang
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Cambridge University Press 2019-12-01
Series:German Law Journal
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S2071832219000804/type/journal_article
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author Shu-Perng Hwang
author_facet Shu-Perng Hwang
author_sort Shu-Perng Hwang
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description Democracy is usually relied upon as an important argument against the excessive influence of international and foreign law on the domestic legal order, and especially on domestic constitutional law. Both in Germany and the United States, skeptics and opponents of the Europeanization or internationalization of domestic constitutional law repeatedly raise democratic concerns. From a comparative perspective, this Article examines the German and American democratic arguments against an overreliance on international and foreign law in constitutional interpretations. In exploring the democratic concerns expressed in German and American discussions, this Article focuses especially on the contrast between German dualism on the one hand and American exceptionalism on the other hand. This Article shows that, while the German dualists and the American exceptionalists base their arguments on different understandings of democracy, they share the viewpoint that democracy can only be realized on the national level, whereas international law aims at uniformity und thus inevitably runs counter to democratic self-governance and self-determination of the states. Precisely in this sense, it can be said that there is no qualitative, but rather only a quantitative distinction between German and American democratic arguments. Thus conceived, the alleged contrast between the principle of open statehood emphasized by German constitutional law scholars and the Constitutional Court and the idea of American exceptionalism embraced by a number of critics of the use of foreign law lies only in the extent to which the reference to international or foreign law in interpreting the domestic Constitution is deemed legitimate and justifiable.
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spelling doaj.art-a26da8f965044c9894950750608751972023-03-09T12:35:10ZengCambridge University PressGerman Law Journal2071-83222019-12-01201119113910.1017/glj.2019.80Foreign Law, Democracy, and Constitutional Interpretation: A German-American ComparisonShu-Perng HwangDemocracy is usually relied upon as an important argument against the excessive influence of international and foreign law on the domestic legal order, and especially on domestic constitutional law. Both in Germany and the United States, skeptics and opponents of the Europeanization or internationalization of domestic constitutional law repeatedly raise democratic concerns. From a comparative perspective, this Article examines the German and American democratic arguments against an overreliance on international and foreign law in constitutional interpretations. In exploring the democratic concerns expressed in German and American discussions, this Article focuses especially on the contrast between German dualism on the one hand and American exceptionalism on the other hand. This Article shows that, while the German dualists and the American exceptionalists base their arguments on different understandings of democracy, they share the viewpoint that democracy can only be realized on the national level, whereas international law aims at uniformity und thus inevitably runs counter to democratic self-governance and self-determination of the states. Precisely in this sense, it can be said that there is no qualitative, but rather only a quantitative distinction between German and American democratic arguments. Thus conceived, the alleged contrast between the principle of open statehood emphasized by German constitutional law scholars and the Constitutional Court and the idea of American exceptionalism embraced by a number of critics of the use of foreign law lies only in the extent to which the reference to international or foreign law in interpreting the domestic Constitution is deemed legitimate and justifiable.https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S2071832219000804/type/journal_articleforeign lawdemocracydualism(American) exceptionalismconstitutional identity
spellingShingle Shu-Perng Hwang
Foreign Law, Democracy, and Constitutional Interpretation: A German-American Comparison
German Law Journal
foreign law
democracy
dualism
(American) exceptionalism
constitutional identity
title Foreign Law, Democracy, and Constitutional Interpretation: A German-American Comparison
title_full Foreign Law, Democracy, and Constitutional Interpretation: A German-American Comparison
title_fullStr Foreign Law, Democracy, and Constitutional Interpretation: A German-American Comparison
title_full_unstemmed Foreign Law, Democracy, and Constitutional Interpretation: A German-American Comparison
title_short Foreign Law, Democracy, and Constitutional Interpretation: A German-American Comparison
title_sort foreign law democracy and constitutional interpretation a german american comparison
topic foreign law
democracy
dualism
(American) exceptionalism
constitutional identity
url https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S2071832219000804/type/journal_article
work_keys_str_mv AT shupernghwang foreignlawdemocracyandconstitutionalinterpretationagermanamericancomparison