Logical Form and Truth-Conditions
<p>This paper outlines a truth-conditional view of logical form, that is, a view according to which logical form is essentially a matter of truth-conditions. The main motivation for the view is a fact that seems crucial to logic. As <strong>§</strong>1 suggests, fundamental logical...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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University of the Basque Country
2013-09-01
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Series: | Theoria |
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Online Access: | http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/4627 |
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author | Andrea Iacona |
author_facet | Andrea Iacona |
author_sort | Andrea Iacona |
collection | DOAJ |
description | <p>This paper outlines a truth-conditional view of logical form, that is, a view according to which logical form is essentially a matter of truth-conditions. The main motivation for the view is a fact that seems crucial to logic. As <strong>§</strong>1 suggests, fundamental logical relations such as entailment or contradiction can formally be explained only if truth-conditions are formally represented.§2 spells out the view. <strong>§</strong>3 dwells on its anity with a conception of logical form that has been defended in the past. <strong>§§</strong>4-6 draw attention to its impact on three major issues that concern, respectively, the extension of the domain of formal explanation, the semantics of tensed discourse, and the analysis of quantication.</p> |
first_indexed | 2024-12-11T04:01:51Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-a2a4b014882f4d98bc46a29f50a3990e |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 0495-4548 2171-679X |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-12-11T04:01:51Z |
publishDate | 2013-09-01 |
publisher | University of the Basque Country |
record_format | Article |
series | Theoria |
spelling | doaj.art-a2a4b014882f4d98bc46a29f50a3990e2022-12-22T01:21:37ZengUniversity of the Basque CountryTheoria0495-45482171-679X2013-09-0128343945710.1387/theoria.46278101Logical Form and Truth-ConditionsAndrea Iacona<p>This paper outlines a truth-conditional view of logical form, that is, a view according to which logical form is essentially a matter of truth-conditions. The main motivation for the view is a fact that seems crucial to logic. As <strong>§</strong>1 suggests, fundamental logical relations such as entailment or contradiction can formally be explained only if truth-conditions are formally represented.§2 spells out the view. <strong>§</strong>3 dwells on its anity with a conception of logical form that has been defended in the past. <strong>§§</strong>4-6 draw attention to its impact on three major issues that concern, respectively, the extension of the domain of formal explanation, the semantics of tensed discourse, and the analysis of quantication.</p>http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/4627logical form, truth-condition |
spellingShingle | Andrea Iacona Logical Form and Truth-Conditions Theoria logical form, truth-condition |
title | Logical Form and Truth-Conditions |
title_full | Logical Form and Truth-Conditions |
title_fullStr | Logical Form and Truth-Conditions |
title_full_unstemmed | Logical Form and Truth-Conditions |
title_short | Logical Form and Truth-Conditions |
title_sort | logical form and truth conditions |
topic | logical form, truth-condition |
url | http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/4627 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT andreaiacona logicalformandtruthconditions |