What Observational/Theoretical Distinction Can Do
Some analytic philosophers have argued that in order to have a genuine distinction the border line should have a completely a priori specified place. This condition has been suggested by some philosophers (e.g. Putnam) to argue that the sharp line between observational terms and theoretical terms i...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | fas |
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University of Isfahan
2014-09-01
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| Series: | Metaphysics |
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| Online Access: | http://uijs.ui.ac.ir/mph/browse.php?a_code=A-10-1-77&slc_lang=en&sid=1 |
| Summary: | Some analytic philosophers have argued that in order to have a genuine distinction the border line should have a completely a priori specified place. This condition has been suggested by some philosophers (e.g. Putnam) to argue that the sharp line between observational terms and theoretical terms is completely “broken-back” since the line is not fixed. This camp, which we label anti-dichotomists, have tried to show that arbitrarily-drawn boundaries do not have any benefit, so it is absurd to add them to our conceptual frameworks. On the other hand, dichotomists believe that although each person can draw this boundary in a different place, it finally exists somewhere and can perform a wide variety of tasks. In this paper, first, we argue even if a distinction cannot be sharply drawn, one cannot conclude that the problem, for its solution the distinction was proposed, is not a genuine problem. The border is useful when and only when it serves some purposes. Second, by appealing to some of Van Fraassen’s insights, namely the “aim of science”, we shall argue that this distinction serves some purposes and thus it is wise to stick to it. In general, it does not matter that a border is fixed or not, it just matters if it matters or not. |
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| ISSN: | 2008-8086 2476-3276 |